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Forord og kort sammendrag 
Formålet med denne studien er å se nærmere på den norske ordningen med 
ekstern kvalitetssikring av store statlige investeringsprosjekter i lys av perspektiver 
fra organisasjonsvitenskapen og teorier om beslutningstaking. Ved å foreta en 
analyse basert på teorier fra disse fagfeltene kommer det frem et bilde som 
supplerer det etablerte kunnskapsmaterialet som omhandler KS-ordningen. Nye 
perspektiver gir ny innsikt. Rapporten har tre deler: 
Den første delen tar for seg kvalitetssikringsordningen i lys av utvalgte 
perspektiver: Et strukturelt-instrumentelt perspektiv gir innsyn i systemets 
oppbygging og struktur, et økonomisk-rasjonelt perspektiv forklarer det tekniske 
planleggingsidealet som ordningen fungerer innenfor, et kulturelt-institusjonelt 
perspektiv peker ut nye utviklingstrekk, et miljøperspektiv ser på presset for bedre 
effektivitet og symbolbruken brukt i systemet, mens ”garbage can” perspektivet 
belyser potensielle uklarheter i systemet.   
Den andre delen ser på kvalitetssikringsordningen i lys av større reformer i 
offentlig sektor. KS-ordningen har kjennetegn som stemmer med både New public 
management (NPM) og senere post-NPM reformer. Planleggingsgrepet og bruken 
av eksterne kvalitetssikringsrådgivere minner om tenkingen innen New Public 
Management, mens KS1 med sitt bidrag til politisk lederskap og kontroll har 
typiske post-NPM kjennetegn.  
Del tre er en diskusjon om hvordan KS-ordningen eventuelt kan forbedres og 
gjøres klarere sett i lys av de foregående analysene. Rapporten konkluderer at det 
kan være fordelaktig med økte ressurser og kompetanse i den sentrale 
administrasjonen for å følge opp ordningen, alternativt å tone noe ned den 
eksterne delen av KS1-ordningen for å sikre god balanse mellom det interne og 
eksterne perspektivet på investeringstiltakene. 
Rapporten er skrevet av Professor Tom Christensen ved Institutt for 
statsvitenskap ved Universitetet i Oslo.  
 
Trondheim, november 2009  
Knut Samset, 
Programansvarlig, Concept-programmet, NTNU 
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Summary 
This report presents a theoretically based analysis of the Norwegian Quality 
Assurance Scheme (QA1 and QA2) for Major Public Projects, drawing on a 
number of different perspectives from organization theory and decision-making 
theory. It starts by presenting the perspectives and using them to characterize, 
analyze and evaluate the quality assurance system. A structural-instrumental 
perspective gives the best insight into the complex design of the system, which 
encompasses both centralizing elements with the potential to increase political 
control, and devolutionary elements, such as the use of private experts. An 
economic-rational perspective helps to explain the technical planning ideal on 
which the system is based, while a cultural-institutional perspective points to a new 
cultural trajectory in the making. An environmental perspective looks at pressure 
from the environment for greater efficiency and at the symbols used by the quality 
assurance system, while the garbage can perspective highlights potential ambiguity 
in the system. 
As a second step the report outlines the main features of New Public Management 
and post-NPM reforms in public sector organizations, and places Norway in the 
comparative reform picture. The main question here is whether the quality 
assurance system has New Public Management or post-NPM features. Quality 
assessment systems as such could be fitted into both reform waves, and the 
Norwegian quality assurance system has features from both types of reform. While 
the quality assurance system’s approach to planning and the inclusion of external 
experts is very much inspired by New Public Management reform thinking, the 
QA1 part of the system, which anchors the system in the central political 
leadership and thus potentially increases political control, is a typical post-NPM 
element. 
Third, the report discusses how the system might be elaborated or improved. 
Assuming that the basic structure of the system will remain in place, one 
improvement would be to increase the resources and competence of those 
responsible for steering and administering the system in the central civil service, 
particularly in the Ministry of Finance. Alternatively, the role of the external 
experts could be scaled back somewhat, particularly in the QA1 phase. More 
resources for planning major public projects in the sectoral ministries and agencies 
could also be developed.  
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Foreword 
This report presents a theoretically based analysis and evaluation of the Norwegian 
Quality Assurance Scheme (QA1 and QA2) for Major Public Projects, which was 
introduced in 2000 (QA2) under the Bondevik I government and extended in 2005 
(QA1) under the Bondevik II government. It will conduct a theoretically based 
discussion and analysis of the scheme or system, or as it is often labeled – ‘regime’, 
for which the point of departure is organization theory, or more specifically a 
combination of instrumental and institutional types of organization theory. This 
type of theory will be used to discuss how the quality assurance system in Norway 
may be understood as an organizational and institutional phenomenon, and how it 
fits into general international trends concerning administrative policy and reforms. 
What characterizes this quality-assurance and planning scheme as a steering, 
regulation and decision-making system in a general and analytical sense? What are 
its potential major strengths and weaknesses, and what improvements might be 
made? 
There is a long and extensive research tradition dealing with major public projects. 
However, the aim of the report is not to address this tradition in any systematic 
way or to try to fit the quality assurance system in Norway into it. Firstly, the 
literature is rather technical and economic in its orientation; secondly, studies often 
deal with the implementation and effects of such projects rather than with the 
front-end part of them; thirdly, they often use completely different types of 
theories and perspectives to study such phenomena. The report will also leave 
aside quality assurances done on various projects since 2000 up to the present as 
well as research done on these and other major public projects in Norway, for 
example in the Concept program. Instead, its focus will be to take a fresh analytical 
look at the quality assurance system in Norway, drawing on a long research 
tradition in political science that combines political theories and 
organization/decision-making theories. 
The structure of the report is as follows: First, the quality assurance system will be 
briefly presented and some of the main questions for analysis and evaluation 
posed. Second, five different analytical perspectives for analysis will be outlined 
and related to the quality assurance system. Third, the development of public 
reforms and political-administrative structures, cultures and practice in recent 
decades will be outlined in a comparative perspective, and the Norwegian quality 
assurance system will be discussed in relation to this development. Fourth, a 
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concluding analysis and discussion of the quality assurance system will be made, 
including outlining strengths and weaknesses and possible improvements. 
11 
Introduction 
What is the quality assurance system? 
The main principles and features of the quality assurance system for Major Public 
Projects in Norway are possible to delimit in the following way. What is called the 
governance regime for major public projects embraces the systems and processes 
that the government (or more generally a financial party) needs to secure successful 
investment. Such a regime should encompass ‘a regulatory framework to ensure 
adequate quality at entry, compliance with agreed objectives, management and 
resolution of issues that may arise during the project, etc., and standards for quality 
review of key governance documents’ (Samset, Berg and Klakegg 2006: 4). An 
analysis of studies of major public projects raises questions about the feasibility of 
project flexibility, the involvement of political and administrative leaders versus 
project autonomy, the type of regulations needed, accountability and transparency 
features, the need for risk analyses, etc. 
 
In 2000 the Norwegian Ministry of Finance introduced a mandatory quality 
assurance system, or ‘mandatory quality-at-entry’ regime (QA2) as it was labeled, to 
reduce implementation costs in major public projects. The majority of members of 
an inter-ministerial committee, which included the major ministries dealing with 
large projects in fields like defense, transport and communications, and labour and 
administration, were against such a system, because they thought that each 
individual ministry should have the autonomy to deal with cost problems in major 
projects (Styringsgruppen 1999). A minority in the committee – the members from 
the Ministry of Finance – however, received the support of the Cabinet for the 
introduction of the new and standardized system (St.prp.nr. 1 (1998-1999). Gul 
Bok; St.prp.nr.1 (1999-2000). Gul Bok). From 2005 the system was extended to 
include quality assurance (QA1) concerning the early choice of the concept/project 
– the idea being to ensure that the projects chosen were appropriate and viable, i.e. 
to ‘stop and think’, primarily in broader cost-benefit and societal terms, before the 
project or concept options became more limited (St.prp.nr. 1 (2004-2005). Gul 
Bok). The interaction between QA1 and QA2 was meant to ensure ‘enduring 
quality and consistency of analysis and decisions’ (Samset, Berg and Klakegg 2006: 
4). One major rationale behind such a quality assurance system is that the 
traditional ideal technocratic planning model is unrealistic and that processes 
involving multiple actors, problems, solutions and decision-making opportunities 
are complex and fluctuate (see March and Olsen 1976). This latter point will be 
discussed later on in the report. 
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The quality assurance system is overall said to have the following features (Samset, 
Berg and Klakegg 2006: 5): It represents a distinct set of milestones and decision-
making hurdles that are applied to major public investment projects in all sectors 
regardless of existing practices and procedures for such projects in the ministries 
and agencies affected. It is intended to secure political control over fundamental 
decisions concerning whether major public projects go ahead or not and increase 
the professional quality of the premises and documents behind such decisions 
(QA1). It anchors the most fundamental decisions in the Cabinet, but the system 
as such is designed so that it is independent of any particular government, i.e. it is a 
set of generally applicable rules and procedures. It is intended to provide an 
adequate basis for major project decisions and to focus on important decisions 
rather than on details. 
A crucial element of the quality assurance system is that pre-qualified external 
consultants are engaged to perform ‘quality-assurance of the decision-making basis 
in all public investment projects with a total budget exceeding 60 million Euros’ 
(Samset, Berg and Klakegg 2006: 5). The first frame agreement with four 
consulting firms was finalized in June 2000 and lasted through 2003, and the new 
one will run through 2008. Around 50 projects were scrutinized in the QA2 system 
during the first four years. In 2005 the QA1 system was introduced and to date 
(2007) has been used in three major public projects. QA1 and QA2 form the so-
called front-end phase of the projects. The QA1, called the feasibility phase, is 
wider and focuses on the choice of concept/solution, while QA2, known as the 
basic design/engineering phase, deals with the budget, management structure, 
contract strategy, etc. for the solution/project alternative chosen.  
QA1 is supposed to be conducted in close consultation with the political 
leadership and anchored in the Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry 
of Finance, and the job of the consultants is to ‘review the professional quality of 
the underlying documents constituting the basis for the decision’. The relevant 
sectoral ministries in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance decide when a 
QA1 should be started. The ministry responsible for the relevant project may 
choose which qualified consultants to employ and must have two alternatives to 
the preferred project, one of which should be a real alternative project and the 
other the option of doing nothing. It should prepare a need analysis, coupling 
stakeholders and their needs and priorities with relevant anticipated investments, 
and then outline an overall strategy specifying ‘consistent, realistic and verifiable 
immediate and long term objectives’, based on the need analysis  (Samset, Berg and 
Klakegg 2006: 6). Furthermore, the ‘overall requirements that need to be fulfilled, 
for instance functional, aesthetic, physical, operational and economic 
requirements’, should be established and an alternative analysis suggested, 
including defining ‘the zero-option and at least two alternative concepts, specifying 
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their operational objectives, essential uncertainties, and cost estimates’ and the 
alternatives should be subjected to a full socio-economic analysis. The consultants 
rank the alternatives proposed by the ministry, and the cabinet then either decides 
to move on to the QA2 phase, or to reject the preferred project and look at 
alternatives. 
Samset, Berg and Klakegg (2006: 6) define the QA2 thus: 
 ‘At the end of the pre-project phase, the QA2 aims to provide the responsible ministry with an 
independent review of decision-making documents before Parliamentary appropriation of funds. 
This is partly a final control to make sure that the budget is realistic and reasonable, and partly a 
forward-looking exercise to identify the managerial challenges ahead. The analysis should help 
substantiate the final decision regarding the funding of the project, and be useful during 
implementation as a reference for control. The focus is on the strategic managerial document, and 
the consultant will review its consistency with previous decisions taken when the concept was 
decided (QA1) as well as the implications for the project of possible changes that might have 
occurred subsequently, and the cost frame, including necessary contingencies to make sure the 
budget is realistic’. 
 
Figure 1 Scope of external quality assurance QA1 and QA2. 
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QA1 is a qualifying step to get a QA2, while QA2 is a qualifying step to participate 
in the budget process. Getting into the QA1 doesn’t guarantee that a QA2 is going 
to happen, and getting a QA2 on a project doesn’t guarantee that the project is 
prioritized by the government or the Stortinget. A QA1 starts with a decision in a 
sector ministry which is having the project and the participation of the Ministry of 
Finance as a quality body, and without a decision on QA1 one is not allowed to 
start pre-project activities. When a QA1 is finished it’s handled by the Ministry of 
Finance and undergoes professional evaluation, and the Cabinet decides on 
whether to go further with a QA2, based on QA1. But it could potentially happen 
that the sectoral ministry proposing the project could also stop the process after 
QA1. If it’s decided to continue with a QA2; after the QA2 report is delivered by 
the external experts, it’s still two options for the Cabinet, either to stop the project 
or to allow it to enter into the budget process, without any guarantee to prioritize 
it. 
 
Figure 2 Two parallel processes – the decision making and the analytical 
process. Source: Samset, Berg and Klakegg (2006:5). 
 
So why develop a quality assurance system of this kind? One reason, like in many 
other countries, was that in the past major public projects has often had unrealistic 
budgets and had overrun the estimated costs, indicating bad planning, but also 
potentially preventing other valuable projects from being implemented (St.prp.nr.1 
(1999-2000): Gul bok). Another reason was the decision-making processes that 
such projects traditionally typically had involved. They often had bottom-up 
features, where the relevant sector administration was in alliance with local political 
initiatives and local campaigns (see Priemus 2007). Examples of this might be 
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road-building projects or military projects. One disadvantage of such processes 
was that they often heavily constrained the central political authorities in their 
ability to prioritize and select projects (St.prp.nr.1 (2004-2005): Gul bok). While it 
was often taken for granted by sectoral and local stakeholders that the alternative 
they supported was good and viable, the central political authorities often wanted 
not a fait accompli but more alternatives to choose from and more leeway for 
central decisions.  
A third reason for such a system was to establish more professional standards for 
the steering of major public projects, by bringing in external consultants as 
independent experts as part of a strengthened control function (St.prp.nr. 1 (1999-
2000): Gul bok). Sectoral expertise in this field was lacking and internal expertise 
could potentially be ‘biased’ in the sense that it was involved in alliances with 
societal stakeholders wishing to further certain projects. Independent experts were 
also associated with good governance, benchmarking and higher professional 
standards. The third reason could also be associated with a development from the 
mid 1990 when the ministries were supposed to become more secretariats for the 
political leadership (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). This implied not only more 
autonomy for subordinate agencies and state companies, but also developing more 
control and scrutiny functions in the ministries. But the resources and expertise of 
controlling large major public projects was lacking and involving external expertise 
was an option. 
When QA2 was introduced, it seemed to be an obvious way of coping with the 
first and third problems – budget realism and independent expertise. QA2 is more 
traditional in its budget and planning focus: while it may potentially further more 
realistic budgets by bringing in external expertise, it probably does not do much to 
change influence patterns and choices. This was one of the reasons why the quality 
assurance system was extended to include the QA1 phase. QA1 was meant to take 
back central political power over the decisions of major public projects and anchor 
it at the central level. The aim was to put the projects in a wider societal 
perspective, increase the alternatives and open the process more by bringing in 
external experts, while at the same time restoring more control to the political 
executive. One paradox of bringing in external consultants in this phase is that they 
may potentially undermine the assumed increase in influence of the political 
executive through their professional expertise and decision-making premises, even 
though QA1 is about political design, development and judgment, the balancing of 
different political interests and concerns, and the balancing of political 
considerations with broader societal ones. So one central question would be how 
much external consultants influence these priorities and balances, i.e. what the 
relative influence of politics and professional expertise is over major public 
projects. Clearly, employing external consultants is intended to bring unambiguous 
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professional advice into ‘muddier’ political processes through quality assurance, 
but this might of course have the side-effect of intervening in the decision-making 
processes over which politicians wish to exert more control. On the other hand, 
external expertise may have a more neutral role and help politicians make more 
considered and informed decisions about projects, without introducing a bias into 
the process.  
Having briefly presented the quality assurance system and its background, we now 
turn to the question of terminology. In the literature on government reforms and 
systems the concepts of ‘governance’ and of ‘regime’ are increasingly being used 
and are sometimes combined to form the term ‘governance regime’. A certain 
amount of skepticism may be in order about the use of these concepts. 
Governance has become a rather fashionable term that is used to describe almost 
any aspect of the work of the political-administrative apparatus, so its content is 
pretty ambiguous. In most cases government would be a better and more precise 
term. Some authors say that government is decision-making, control and planning 
systems inside the political-administrative apparatus, while governance extends this 
system to non-public actors, like the ‘joined-up’ system created by Tony Blair in 
the UK (Pollitt 2003). QA1 and QA2 seem much more to be a government than a 
governance system in this respect. The word ‘regime’ is also rather loose. In 
political science, regime is connected to theories of international relations, while 
recently regime has had a tendency to be used both theoretically and empirically to 
describe almost any national political-administrative system or structure. Regime is 
also frequently used by the media almost interchangeably with the words 
government or administration, particularly in the US. Given these concerns, 
inconsistencies and ambiguities we are reluctant to use either the term ‘governance 
regime’ or the two concepts separately in this report. A better and broader term 
would usually be quality assurance system or structure, or sometimes government 
system or government quality-assurance system. 
 
The main questions 
Organization theory and decision-making theory in political science embrace a 
variety of perspectives that could be labeled either instrumental or institutional and 
which may be used in an analysis and evaluation of the Norwegian quality 
assurance system for major public projects (see Peters 1999, Scott and Davies 
2006). We use five such perspectives: an economic-rational, an instrumental-
structural, a cultural, an environmental and a garbage can perspective (Boston et al. 
1996, Christensen et al. 2007, March and Olsen 1976 and 1983, Olsen 1992, 
Selznick 1957). One may question whether the first perspective really belongs to 
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this group of organization theory perspectives, but that is not an important issue 
here. Such a rational perspective forms the basis for many control, planning and 
regulation systems, and as such represents an ideal that may be challenged by the 
other perspectives (March 1994). 
First, the perspectives will be outlined in terms of how they see actors in public 
decision-making processes, how they imagine the control of and organizational 
thinking in such processes and how they view the establishment and 
implementation of public reforms. These perspectives will then be used in a 
general analysis of the Norwegian quality assurance system. We will ask how 
different elements in this system can be understood in terms of these perspectives, 
using a method similar to that employed by Allison (1971): both looking for 
different elements according to the different perspectives and analyzing the 
different elements from different angles. This analysis will not be concerned with 
the details of the quality assurance system; rather it is preoccupied with some 
general features that are followed up in the comparative section and primarily in 
the final analysis. 
 
Second, the comparative development of public reforms and political-
administrative structures in recent decades will be outlined in a discussion 
addressing the main features of the reform wave New Public Management (NPM), 
which emerged in the early 1980s, and also of the post-NPM reforms, which 
started in the late 1990s (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The Norwegian 
administrative reforms, policy and practice will then briefly be compared to the 
overall pattern, and Norway’s role as a reluctant reformer will be discussed. We 
end this section by asking whether the Norwegian quality assurance system has 
elements from New Public Management or post-NPM reforms, or both. 
 
Third and last, the Norwegian quality assurance system will be more systematically 
analyzed and evaluated, in terms of the theoretical perspectives and modern public 
reforms, and its strengths and weaknesses, and possible improvements, will be 
identified. What will emerge is a picture of a rather complex system, containing 
many elements pointing in different directions. 
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Perspectives on public decision-making 
processes 
Generic perspectives 
The organization-theory and decision-making perspectives presented here are 
broad and generic, meaning that in principle they could be used to discuss any 
public decision-making system or process. The quality assurance system organizes 
a particular type of public decision-making process and embraces elements of a 
control or regulation process, a planning process, a quality-assurance process, a 
technical and an economic process; primarily though, it of course frames a political 
and administrative process connected to the central level.  
 
The economic-rational perspective 
The economic-rational perspective, often labeled an ‘economic man’ concept, is 
based on ideas about what drives actors in decision-making processes and how this 
thinking can be applied to the structure and functioning of the public sector 
(March 1994). This perspective is primarily based on the notion that to understand 
(and improve) society in general and the functioning of the political-administrative 
system in particular, one must proceed from the notion of individual actors who 
pursue their own interests and are preoccupied with incentives. Actors think and 
act strategically to attain personal goals and are primarily utility-maximizing 
individuals (Boston et al. 1996, Egeberg 1995, Evans et al. 1996, Hood 1998). 
According to the cultural theory propounded by Mary Douglas (1986), 
individualists, like economic man, score low on both ‘group’ (feelings of belonging 
to a group) and ‘grid’ (feelings of being controlled by societal rules of a formal and 
informal nature). An economic man is in the extreme an atomist actor with few 
historical or social constraints who is little influenced by the society and 
institutions surrounding him/her (March and Olsen 1989). 
For the purposes of this report it is relevant to discuss how this economic way of 
thinking is used in the design and functioning of public organizations, i.e. how is 
this individually oriented thinking translated to the collective and institutional 
level? Effective rational (re)design of public organizations entails using some major 
features of rational theories of choice: a combination of control by major 
participants in the process, and a theoretical framework yielding clear, apriori goals, 
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unambiguous means-end thinking and full information about the possible 
consequences of choosing different reforms and courses of action (March 1994, 
March and Olsen 1983, March and Olsen 1989). 
The economic-rational perspective is not homogeneous or totally consistent, which 
makes it all the more interesting to see how it is translated into public reforms and 
design. For example, Boston et al. (1996), in an analysis of the economic thinking 
behind the reforms launched in New Zealand in the early 1980s, show that 
different directions in new institutional economic theory – rational choice theory, 
principal-agent theory and transaction-cost theory – resulted in different reform 
solutions (although there are, of course, many similarities too), because they 
focused on different economic mechanisms. This underscores the point of variety, 
but also the potential ambiguity in coupling economic theory with practical 
application and structural design. 
We will outline just some of the most relevant versions of this perspective used in 
public reforms. One version of the economic-rational perspective is the principal-
agent theory (Knott and Hammond 2003). This is a theory that has been used to 
focus on the relationship between the public and elected bodies/representatives, 
between political executives and civil servants, between political executives and 
agencies/state-owned enterprises, and between the public bureaucracy and external 
experts, interest groups, citizens and users/clients. The main thought is that the 
principal-agent relationship is a problematic relationship in many ways, mainly 
because the principal cannot trust that the agent is doing what he or she is 
supposed to do. This is among other things due to informational asymmetry, i.e. 
the agent will act self-interestedly and not provide the principal with enough 
information, so that decisions and control become problematic. This may be 
solved or modified through the use of incentives or structural ways to control the 
agents. This type of theory can be criticized in various ways. One criticism is that 
the theory does not focus enough on problems the agents may have: for example, 
that they may have more than one principal, and steering signals may be conflicting 
and inconsistent, reflecting complex public decision-making processes. Another 
crucial factor is whether the goals the principals set for the agents are clear enough 
to act upon; often they are not when it comes to public decision-making processes.  
Principal-agent theory has especially focused on formal institutional design of 
structural devolution and delegation and when and why political executives create 
agencies and transfer formal power to them. But it may of course be relevant 
regarding any delegation of public authority, such as downwards in the public 
hierarchy or to external actors or experts. Agencies are supposed to deal with 
informational asymmetries, handling blame and increasing credibility and 
efficiency. Agencies can act contrary to the preferences of their political bosses 
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(‘agency losses’) by following their own preferences (‘shrinking’) or because the 
agency has incentives to behave contrary to the wishes of the political executives 
(‘slippage’) (Thatcher 2005). This theory has also formed the basis for 
marketization and privatization and has inspired contract systems that use 
incentives and performance-enhancing structures. 
A second version of the perspective is public choice theory, which also 
presupposes that politicians and bureaucrats are motivated by self-interest. This 
theory, which is skeptical towards collective interests and ethical-institutional 
considerations, is part of a conservative or neo-liberal agenda advocating a small 
state and extensive personal freedom. Boston et al. (1996) mention some examples 
of this theory as applied in New Public Management reforms in New Zealand. It 
has inspired vertical structural specialization, where policy advice, regulation and 
implementation are divided, and it is also behind calls for larger central political 
staffs and alternative external policy advice to counteract the influence of 
bureaucrats. The theory also underlines the need for increased transparency and 
insight into vested interests and competition bias, clearer definition in contracts of 
rights and duties for public and private actors, and a reduction in the scope of 
influence of political executives in order to make some policy areas more 
autonomous. Critics of this theory assert that its premises for action are not very 
plausible and that it has little predictive power, and they ask about alternative logics 
of action. They also question whether one should take self-interest for granted and 
accept it or try to limit it, because that has implications for the design of public 
organizations. 
Transaction-cost theory, primarily connected to the work of Oliver Williamson 
(1976), is primarily preoccupied with decreasing insecurity and costs in 
transactions, and focuses on the best way to organize production and the exchange 
of goods and services. The theory compares transaction costs and the use of 
hierarchies or markets, and the main idea is that a hierarchy should be used where 
there is a high level of insecurity, specialized activities and little competition. Critics 
point out that this theory takes little account of social, cultural and moral 
constraints. In addition the definition of the term transaction costs is held to be 
ambiguous and the relevance of this theory for the design of the public apparatus 
is questioned.  
A fourth relevant version of the economic-rational perspective is the one that 
addresses the connection between self-interest and capture, which is often taken 
into account in designing regulatory structures. It combines economic analysis with 
analysis of political behaviour (Peltzman 1998), and it asserts that special interests 
and interest groups will try to pursue their own goals and influence the outcome of 
public decision-making processes. A main focus is on power relations and self-
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interested economic and political competition for scarce resources. In regulatory 
processes civil servants may, for example, go ‘native’ and be captured by the 
interests they were designed to control or regulate, leading interest groups or 
external actors in general to lobby for public solutions from which they will benefit 
(Stigler 1971). Another option, sometimes called a bureau-shaping perspective 
(Dunleavy 1985, James 2003), expects bureaucrats and their institutions to benefit 
from the decisions made and the structures designed (Majone 1996). One outcome 
might be, for example, that autonomous public units, like regulatory agencies, 
begin to set their own standards rather than those formulated by the legislature and 
the political executive (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
So how can we understand the Norwegian quality assurance system in terms of the 
economic-rational perspective, using elements from the different sub-theories 
presented? How might self-interest become relevant in such a quality assurance 
system? One possibility is that the political executive acts self-interestedly. It is not 
easy to tell what their personal interests might be in major public projects, except 
for cases where a project promises benefits for them personally or for their 
constituency, which is not all that likely (see Egeberg 1995). What is more relevant 
is that various political executives will try to further their organizational or 
institutional interests, based on sector/policy area, like in the old bottom-up 
oriented system for major public projects. But there is, of course, no guarantee that 
their interests will be compatible, so this could add to the complexity of such 
processes, even though the new quality assurance system tries to further more 
collective interests and the system is more centralized and hierarchical. The same 
reasoning could be used for administrative leaders or internal experts. So political 
executives and administrative leaders from sectoral ministries and agencies may 
potentially have different interests from the actors in the Cabinet/Prime Minister’s 
Office and the Ministry of Finance. And what about the external consultants? They 
are, of course, interested in earning money but also in doing a good professional 
job, so it is not entirely clear what their self-interest might be when it comes to 
major public projects. They may potentially side with the actors running the quality 
assurance system, but also with sectoral interests, making alliances influencing the 
crucial decisions.  
Second, the logic on which the thinking in the quality assurance process is based 
has obvious features from this perspective. It could be characterized by a demand 
for unambiguous, apriori goals to steer the process, coupled with systematic 
strategies and an analysis of needs and requirements. As such it has features of a 
traditional technocratic and economically oriented planning process. There is, 
however a difference between the QA1 and QA2 phases; the first phase is more 
open, since it involves three alternatives for action being presented by the 
responsible ministries and then analyzed and evaluated with the participation of 
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political executives, administrative leaders and experts; the second phase, on the 
other hand, is more closed, traditional, technocratic and rational in its elaboration 
by experts of the chosen project or alternative. 
Third, in certain respects the quality assurance as a decision-making process seems 
to deviate from some features of the economic-rational perspective. The most 
important deviation is that the political leadership is meant to play a hands-on role 
and be tightly coupled to the first QA1 phase, while this perspective often 
emphasizes that it’s better to avoid the involvement of politicians. On the other 
hand, external consultants are coupled to and central to the whole process, which 
might potentially undermine political control and influence. An important factor is 
also how the administrative leaders and experts in the relevant ministries and 
agencies act. Will they clearly act in accord with the political leadership, and have a 
common understanding of problems, solutions and norms, or will they act more 
according to a bureau-shaping theory and further their own interests and solutions, 
possibly in an understanding with external actors? Here we also see a kind of triple 
principle-agent relationship; the political executive-administrative leader 
relationship, the political executive-external consultants’ relationship and the 
administrative leader-external consultants’ relationship. 
Fourth, if we combine the analytical aspect (means-end thinking or rational 
calculation) with the decision or participant aspects (actors and influence) (March 
and Olsen 1976), there may be similarities at one extreme with this rational 
perspective, for according to a kind of capture logic the external 
consultants/experts, possibly in collaboration with leaders and experts inside the 
ministries and agencies, may dominate the planning process both in QA1 and 
QA2. At the other extreme, the political executives may dominate QA1 relative to 
their own administrative leaders and external experts, and determine the 
fundamental problems, definitions and solutions and thus provide important 
premises for QA2. The reality would probably be somewhere in between the two 
alternatives. It is therefore crucial to analyze the relative importance of the external 
experts and administrative leaders and under what conditions the balance would be 
towards one of the extremes. 
Fifth, a central thought in this perspective is that autonomy is good, because it 
increases efficiency and professional expertise, and this argument is at the same 
time skeptical about the role of the political executive, holding that alternative 
policy advice and expertise, from external actors, is also valuable (see Halligan 2001 
for examples of this in the Australian system). The quality assurance system’s 
inclusion of external consultants constitutes such an element. At the same time, 
though, their participation potentially may undermine the accountability and 
authority of public leaders. Yet transaction-cost theory says that the active use of 
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hierarchy modifies insecurity in public decision-making processes, and the 
introduction of QA1 to supplement QA2 is an example of this. So the quality 
assurance system shows that this type of perspective is internally inconsistent, 
while at the same time revealing a potential inconsistency and tension in the quality 
assurance system. 
 
The instrumental-structural perspective 
A similarity between this perspective and the economical-rational one is that they 
both see the analytical aspect as an important part of public decision-making 
processes. (March and Simon 1958). They are both preoccupied with examining 
the ‘logic of consequence’, i.e. what happens if one chooses certain alternatives or 
solutions based on collective public goals. The main difference between them 
concerning rational calculation is the difference between bounded rationality and 
full rationality in organizational thinking (March 1994). While the rational 
perspective demands full rationality, the instrumental one talks about bounded 
rationality and satisfying solutions. The latter logic proceeds from the view that the 
world is rather complex and that public decision-makers have to select certain 
decision-making premises because they have attention and capacity problems 
(Simon 1957). What is important for that selection is the formal structure, i.e. the 
position and tasks the individual actors have will pre-select most of the decision-
making premises, in other words, one’s structural position governs how one thinks 
and acts. This means that the structural design or structure of public organizations 
is important for the main content of decision-making processes. 
Another main difference between the two perspectives is that the instrumental one 
focuses more on the decision-making structure and the actor aspect than the 
rational one. The rational perspective takes it for granted that the analytical aspect 
will prevail, with apriori goals and related means, and is less preoccupied with how 
leaders control decision-making processes, because hierarchical control is taken for 
granted. The instrumental perspective focuses more on the reasons behind 
problems of control. One reason could be that public goals are rather ambiguous 
and that it is therefore difficult to receive support and legitimacy from the various 
stakeholders (Allison 1983, Christensen et al. 2007). Another is that political and 
administrative leaders may have problems of control because of heterogeneity in 
the leadership or resistance from certain actors inside or outside the public 
apparatus. 
The instrumental-structural perspective exists in two versions (March and Olsen 
1983). The first one, the hierarchical version, is the one most similar to the 
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economic-rational perspective. Its basic premise is that the political and 
administrative leadership, who are presupposed to be rather homogeneous, are the 
main actors in important public decision-making processes. They either participate 
themselves or control the central actors in the process. The decision-making 
processes are rather closed concerning the number of participants and the 
problems, solutions and decision-making situations are rather fixed (March and 
Olsen 1976). In terms of the participants, predictability and control are not seen in 
the same way as in the rational perspective concerning organizational thinking or 
rational calculation. The ideal is that goals, problems and alternatives are rather 
unambiguous, but as indicated, the actors are bounded in their rationality, so there 
is bound to be a certain degree of limited insight and some ambiguity concerning 
all these aspects. 
The other version is the negotiation version, also called bureaucratic politics 
(Allison 1971, Cyert and March 1963). The premise here is that a public 
organization is by definition heterogeneous concerning actors and their interests, 
experience, education and general socio-economic make-up, cultural background, 
etc. This leads to a modification of the control aspect of the decision-making 
process. Instead of leaders being homogeneous and having hierarchical control, 
leaders and organizational units engage in conflicts and negotiations (March and 
Olsen 1983). There are different ways to reach decisions and select solutions under 
such conditions. One is for the majority to decide; another one, more common in 
Scandinavia, is to reach a compromise. A third option is to agree to disagree, 
whereby a quasi-resolution of conflicts is established, fulfilling the interests of 
certain actors at one point in time, and of others at other points in time, in a 
sequential attention to problems and solutions (Cyert and March 1963). Compared 
to both the rational and the hierarchical versions of the instrumental perspective, 
solutions and alternatives in this negotiation version are potentially more 
ambiguous, but they may also be more legitimate, since more actors are involved in 
the decisions that often take more time (Mosher 1967). 
The instrumental-structural perspective is much more explicit and clear about the 
implications of the effects of structuring the public apparatus in certain ways than 
the rational perspective, which does not put much emphasis on this aspect (Boston 
et al. 1996). Luther Gulick (1937), in a seminal work on the structuring of the US 
federal administration, stressed that there is a connection between public goals, the 
way one organizes public organizations according to those goals and the content of 
public decisions and policy. Or as Weaver and Rockman (1993) put it – ‘structure 
matters’. The two basic structural dimensions Gulick is preoccupied with are 
specialization and coordination – dimensions that are rather closely connected and 
have both a vertical and horizontal dimension. Horizontal specialization is related 
to the division of tasks and functions on the same hierarchical level and may, 
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according to Gulick (1937), attend to principles of either purpose, process, 
clientele or geography, often with purpose as the first organizing principle. Vertical 
specialization is related to the allocation of authority, functions and tasks across 
hierarchical levels. The organizational or structural type of coordination can either 
be the horizontal coordination of tasks and activities on the same hierarchical level, 
or hierarchical or vertical coordination, control and integration between levels. 
Specialization, whether horizontal or vertical, has both an intra-organizational and 
an inter-organizational aspect (Egeberg 2003). Intra-organizational specialization 
may either be horizontal specialization of functions and tasks inside a ministry or 
agency, or vertical specialization between hierarchical levels in the same unit. Inter-
organizational specialization can either be horizontal specialization and allocation 
of functions and tasks between ministries or agencies on the same level, or vertical 
specialization between ministries on the one hand and subordinate agencies or 
state-owned enterprises on the other. The relevance of these distinctions will be 
explored further in the next section where we discuss reform developments and 
the quality assurance system. 
So, how can this instrumental perspective give us insight into the quality assurance 
system? First, the overall focus on formal structure in the perspective may give 
more insight than the rational perspective. The quality assurance system is in some 
ways special. To have a separately organized quality assurance system is something 
new, to divide it into QA1 and QA2 is another aspect, and to bring in external 
experts in the way this has been done is also somewhat unusual in a setting like 
this. So the quality assurance system is structurally rather complex and represents a 
kind of structural innovation. The complexity is more evident related to other parts 
of the Norwegian public decision-making system in general, and control and 
scrutiny systems more specifically, than comparatively to other countries.1 
Alternatively, the whole quality assurance system could have been organized in an 
integrated way with only public actors and public experts, and with more resources 
allocated, either together or separately in some of the ministries with the largest 
public projects.  
So, based on the instrumental perspective, one can ask what effect the way the 
quality assurance system is structured or organized has. Is it generally better for the 
main aims of the system, for quality assurance and planning, to organize a separate 
quality assurance system and to do it in this way? Does the quality assurance 
system give the political leadership enough influence, whether by this we mean the 
                                                            
1   The comparable UK system – the OGC Gateway Process is very complex (see 
www.ogc.gov.uk/ what_is_ogc_gateway_review.asp). 
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political executives in the QA1 phase or the Stortinget in the QA2 phase? What 
does QA1 actually add to the more traditional QA2 phase? Do the external experts 
involved in the quality assurance system provide good alternative quality assurance, 
or does this way of organizing primarily give them too much influence relative to 
the political and administrative leadership in the ministries and agencies? 
These are questions that we will follow up later, both in the reform section and in 
the final analysis section. But if we look at relevant research on the underlying 
structural questions, some preliminary answers may already be suggested, at least in 
a broader perspective. The fact that external experts are so deeply involved in the 
process is an example of vertical inter-organizational specialization or structural 
devolution but also indicates profound access to public decision-making processes 
by those private experts; processes that traditionally have got their legitimacy from 
an internal focus and appropriate process features. Potentially this gives the 
external experts an influential position in the quality assurance system. This 
potential may, however, be limited in some ways, either by the political leadership 
balancing different considerations and decision-making premises, where the 
external experts are one of many actors, or by administrative leaders in the 
ministries and agencies trying to counteract the influence of the external experts if 
necessary. Ministry of Finance has a special role of controlling the control job done 
by the external experts, to avoid biases in the process. 
The fact that quality assurance is organized as a separate system and not integrated 
in the government hierarchy in a more traditional way may also be analyzed from 
an instrumental perspective. Experiences with this form of organization, whether 
reorganization or reform projects, have shown that it has both advantages and 
disadvantages. One advantage is the specialized attention and capacity structure, 
meaning that there is a specialized organizational structure in the Ministry of 
Finance, that there are rules for quality assurance involving political executives and 
administrative leaders, and that external experts are employed to focus solely on 
quality assurance of major public projects. Alternatively, these tasks would have 
had to compete with ordinary tasks inside government and would probably receive 
less attention. One disadvantage of this form of organization is that the quality 
assurance system would be less integrated in the hierarchy and might prompt 
resistance from other government units, although this would be modified by the 
fact that this is in some ways a certified, self-contained and mandatory system. The 
system potentially puts less weight on planning and proposals from the ministries 
and agencies, or modifies this influence, which may be seen as both positive and 
negative, depending on where the actors in question are situated. 
The fact that the quality assurance system has been changed and a QA1 phase 
added does in a way potentially change the concept. This structural separation 
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means that the system overall is more closely connected to the political leadership 
than it was with just the QA2 system. It has potentially become more hierarchical 
and politically oriented, and QA1 may also strengthen the Ministry of Finance and 
the quality assurance actors there. But what kind of overall effect this will have on 
the influence of the Storting is more questionable. On the one hand, it may make it 
even harder for the Storting to resist project proposals, but on the other hand it 
may indeed improve the quality of the projects and save public money, which can 
then be used for other purposes. 
But traditionally the planning of major public projects has also had obvious 
negative elements. Such projects have been proposed through local initiatives, 
proposals have come from ministries and agencies, and the Directorate of Public 
Construction and Property (DPCP), for instance, has planned and elaborated some 
of the projects, etc. The Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of 
Finance have then balanced all the different considerations, interests and 
competences and made crucial decisions. The quality assurance system has in some 
ways rebalanced the quality assurance and added to the complexity of such a 
system, and also added one set of mandatory actors, namely the private 
consultants, whose participation may modify the hierarchical elements in the 
system, or at least counteract some of the influence of the traditional actors. 
Concerning the rational calculation or organizational thinking behind a traditional 
planning system in government, it is not easy to say what the elements of hierarchy 
and negotiations will really bring. Hierarchical control may imply scoring high on 
rational calculation, and negotiation features may primarily create conflicts between 
different interests, confusion and ambiguity concerning problems and solutions. 
But negotiation features may also lead to more thorough consideration of issues 
and more discussion of the solutions; after all, hierarchical control does not 
guarantee a thorough analytical process. So how does the quality assurance system 
address this balance? In principle the increased participation and influence of 
external experts may make the decision-making basis better, but it may also 
potentially add complexity and weaken the decision-making premises of 
governmental actors. Only a deeper analysis of several of these projects may 
eventually reveal the influence on rational calculation of these experts, i.e. the 
quality of organizational thinking, particularly in the QA1 phase. 
 
The cultural-institutional perspective 
According to this perspective, public organizations develop gradually and are not 
possible to design and control, as assumed in the rational and instrumental 
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perspectives. Through a gradual adaptation to external (task environment) and 
internal pressure a public organization goes through a process of 
institutionalization (Selznick 1957). This process leads to the development of 
cultural features of a unique character, encompassing informal norms and values. 
These norms and values are supposed to be more important for the thoughts and 
actions of public actors than formal norms, and they influence the development of 
formal structures. 
The history and traditions of public institutions are important (Peters 1999; Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992), for the formative years of such institutions influence greatly 
the path or trajectory the institutions follow thereafter. This is labeled path-
dependency. In other words, the past is overrepresented in the informal 
institutional norms followed today. When people join a public institution, whether 
as a political representative or as a civil servant, they will be socialized and 
disciplined just as much according to the informal norms and values as the formal 
ones (Lægreid and Olsen 1978). Krasner (1988) says that an organization with 
strong institutional or cultural features will have actors who score high both on 
vertical depth, meaning that the informal norms and values are important for their 
thoughts and actions, and on horizontal width, implying that they are aware that what 
other actors are doing is culturally similar or integrated with what they do 
themselves. 
When people act inside public institutions, they act according to a logic of 
appropriateness, not according to a logic of consequence, which is typical for the rational 
and instrumental perspectives (March and Olsen 1989). An experienced politician 
or civil servant knows how to act according to informal norms and values, without 
having to calculate or analyze much, i.e. their behaviour is intuitive, based on 
experience. March (1994) labels this matching behavior – actors are able to match 
situation, cultural expectations and identities in order to act in an appropriate way. 
This perspective tells us that reforms in public organizations or institutions are 
very much about compatibility. When reforms are decided on or implemented, 
they will easily be implemented if they fit in well culturally with existing informal 
norms and values (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). If they are more on the 
incompatible side, the reforms will either be bounced back or only partly and 
pragmatically implemented to fit in with existing norms. 
There are some standard types of critique of this perspective. One is that the 
perspective underestimates the importance of formal norms for action. Another is 
that it is not all that clear what the mechanisms are when organizations adapt to 
internal and external pressure. A third is that informal norms and values are often 
heterogeneous and inconsistent, making it difficult to socialize and discipline 
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organizational members and develop a dominant logic of appropriateness 
(Christensen and Røvik 1999). 
Has the cultural perspective any relevance for understanding the quality assurance 
system that has emerged? While the quality assurance system attends to a 
development path, it has also potentially established a new tradition and a new 
logic of appropriateness. Traditionally, major public projects have had a rather 
varied planning process and culture, depending on the type of project, the 
ministries and agencies involved and the number of stakeholders, and a more 
conventional way of thinking about planning and quality assessment. The old 
system seems to be more sectorally, administratively and locally anchored than the 
new one. The new quality assurance system in many ways represents a break with 
the past and the beginning of a new development path, prompted by problems and 
crises of costs and quality (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Quality assessment is 
overall more culturally embedded than more technical planning and there is a more 
explicit involvement of the political and administrative leadership. There is also a 
new set of quality assurance rules, the Ministry of Finance has a new and more 
central role to play, and external consultants are systematically involved. Basically 
this is about developing a new quality assurance culture, but it is too early to tell 
what the major content of this culture will be. One major question will be whether 
and how the involvement of external consultants will change the more traditional 
planning culture of major public projects and develop a distinct and modern 
quality assurance culture, and if so with what effects. 
 
An environmental perspective 
Meyer and Rowan (1978) emphasize that the environment of an organization is 
divided into two parts: the technical environment and the institutional 
environment. The technical environment is connected to technical activities in an 
organization, i.e. an organization is concerned with making decisions and 
producing services and as such is connected to the environment, because it is 
dependent on resources from the technical environment or dependent on the 
technical environment receiving its products. Examples could be that a university 
has the Ministry of Higher Education as the technical environment, and it must 
both follow formal rules and procedures, accounting for the money received for its 
daily activities, and produce research, educational services and graduates. Another 
example is an agency, which has the superior ministry as a technical environment. 
A third example might be the European Union whose directives are a technical 
environment for Norwegian government organizations. 
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This way of looking at the environment is very much in accordance with the 
instrumental perspective. One crucial question is how important the technical 
environment is for the individual public organization. At one extreme, in a 
deterministic version, the organization is a sort of ‘prisoner of the environment’, 
i.e. the relationship is very asymmetric in disfavour of the single organization 
(Olsen 1992, Scott and Davies 2006). This is an organization that is extremely 
dependent on and vulnerable towards the technical environment. At the other 
extreme, a public organization may be so strong that it in many ways may 
dominate its technical environment, like a very powerful Ministry of Finance in 
some countries. This means that the organization in many ways may create its own 
technical environmental constraints. Of importance is that the technical 
environment consists of either a rather homogeneous set of actors, or one 
dominant actor, or a rather heterogeneous set of actors, where the different actors 
may have different interests and put different types of pressure on the 
organization. It is quite common for the internal technical-formal structure of a 
public organization to be similar to or congruent with the structure of important 
actors in the environment.  
How might this way of thinking be relevant for understanding the quality 
assurance system? First, we must decide what the unit of analysis is. If it is the 
single project, the technical environment will primarily be the quality assurance 
system and the actors organizing and controlling it. This technical pressure relates 
primarily to the mandatory demand for going through QA1 and QA2, which could 
be seen as allowing relatively little discretion. Our focus, however, is on the quality 
assurance system as such, and the technical pressure here could point in different 
directions, depending on the interests of stakeholders. The cabinet, the 
Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance may wish to save 
public money for other public purposes and overall improve the quality of major 
projects, and to increase their legitimacy, because the quality assurance works well 
as a technical system. Sectoral ministries and agencies, particularly the most 
relevant ones with many large projects, would probably share many of these 
concerns, but might be skeptical towards either the way the quality assurance is 
organized and controlled or the way it works. The Stortinget would generally share 
many of the considerations of the political executives, but different parties might 
have different agendas concerning the system, not guaranteeing always to support 
it. Other technical pressure could come from international organizations, like the 
European Union, or standardization and quality assurance-type organizations, 
domestic private stakeholders like consulting firms, which both have potential 
expertise to offer and business to earn, the media, and public and private actors 
who are affected by the major public projects at a lower level. If external pressure 
is consistent and strong, the actors running the quality assurance would have little 
leeway and would have to deliver to sustain their legitimacy, while a more 
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heterogeneous environment and demands pointing in different directions would 
make it more feasible to engage in negotiations or attend to some demands but not 
others. 
The term ‘institutional environment’ is inspired by the theories of social 
constructivism, anthropology and symbolism, often collected in what is labeled 
new institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Scott 2001). The main thought is 
that generally an organization or formal structure, in this case the quality assurance 
system, is exposed to an institutional environment where there may be many myths 
circulating, for example, about how to organize public organizations. Primary here 
is not so much technical pressure with more specific technical rules and demands, 
but instead the symbolic pressure of the institutional environment. The 
environment, whether international or national, may, for example, take for granted 
that certain reforms or new systems for organizing, recruiting or improving quality 
are better than all the others and should therefore be implemented (see Sahlin-
Andersson 2001). As in many other aspects of New Public Management reforms 
there may be ideological reasons for this or it may simply be that actors – like the 
OECD, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the World Trade Organisation, etc. on an international level, or domestic actors in 
Norway such as ministries or private actors – would like to improve their standing 
and influence. Myths may be either very broad or narrower and are in the latter 
definition often labeled institutional standards, concepts or ‘prescriptions’ (Røvik 
2007). 
This theory further says that pressure from the institutional environment is strong 
and not easy to deflect or avoid (Meyer and Rowan 1978). Myths that are 
completely dominant are particularly difficult to avoid and one has to implement 
them in order to be seen as modern or efficient, whether they have been proven 
efficient or not. When many organizations adapt to the myths in the institutional 
environment, organizations develop isomorphic features, i.e. they become similar, 
at least on the surface (Scott and Davies 2006). 
What myths can offer an individual public organization exposed to them is a 
promise of enhanced legitimacy (Brunsson 1989). Normally an organization’s 
legitimacy is connected to technical matters and results, but according to this 
theory it is also related to the manipulation of myths. A successful organization 
would be able to ‘double-talk’, meaning that in some periods or situations it would 
act technically, while in other periods it would deal in symbols and talk without 
actually doing much instrumentally. It is said that balancing these two aspects may 
enhance legitimacy. It is also possible to relate to the environment with talk and to 
the internal organization with action, or to relate to certain parts of the 
environment or the internal organization with talk and other parts with action 
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(Brunsson 1989). The main thing about imported myths is that they are not 
implemented as such, but will act as window-dressing, i.e. symbols that, for 
example, create the superficial impression that there is something modern going on 
in the organization. To say it in Goffman’s words (1990) – front-stage there are 
myths, symbols and talk, back-stage there is action not much coupled to what’s 
going on front-stage. 
This type of theory may sound cynical, but it reflects a long tradition in political 
theory of attending to the importance of symbols for actors and decisions in 
political life (Edelman 1964). This particular myth theory has, however, been both 
criticized and elaborated on various grounds. The main critique is that it presumes 
that myth-related processes are natural system processes, meaning that myths are 
created, spread and imported through processes in which no actor can interfere 
very much. Public organizations have to take myths on board, through a kind of 
deterministic process.  
The alternative interpretation of this is that an organization’s relationship with the 
institutional environment is also governed by instrumental elements (Røvik 2002 
and 2007). These may take the form of gate-keepers – i.e., actors that are selecting 
and influencing the myths a public organization should be exposed to, consciously 
keeping action and talk apart, or the handling and implementation of myths, etc. 
According to this interpretation leaders or experts in public organizations may 
intentionally import myths, whether from one source or from different 
organizational fields, but in reality they are able to keep talk and action apart via a 
variety of strategies and they will also try to implement and use some of the myths, 
or translate or combine some myth elements. 
Another type of critique calls into question a core element of the myth theory – 
namely, the argument that double-talk is possible and increases legitimacy, i.e. 
basically a positive interpretation. It argues that double-talk is not that easy and 
may lead to problems. Brunsson (1989) shows in some of his empirical studies that 
there may be a problem of levels, i.e. leaders will more easily understand the 
dynamics of double-talk since they are at a high level in the hierarchy, but actors at 
a lower level may see talk as tantamount to action. The same type of mechanism is 
shown by Christensen (1991) in his study of the implementation of Management-
by-Objectives (MBO) in higher educational institutions, where managers on a 
middle and lower level saw the reform as a real program that had to be 
implemented, while at the level of higher leadership the reform was seen largely as 
symbolic. A third example of potential problems is Christensen and Lægreid’s 
(2002) study of the Bondevik I government in Norway from 1997 to 2000. The 
government’s main slogan was ‘a simplified Norway’. Initially most cabinet 
members saw this slogan as both a symbol and as action, but over time they 
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realized that the balance had shifted to more talk and less action, a development 
that was not seen as only positive, since it created cynicism. 
This environmental perspective may be used to understand some aspects of the 
quality assurance system. Overall, many modern reforms, like quality assurance 
systems, can be understood not only as technical systems but as myths (see 
Moldenæs 1999). Main actors often argue that installing such systems indicates the 
existence of a modern and efficiency-oriented public sector that cares about 
quality. Whether this is true or not may not be that important if it is accepted that 
this is the case. In other words this involves influencing other actors’ meaning and 
definition of problems and solutions, a process that is not technical. The success of 
quality assurance systems as myths may therefore also depend on public leaders 
manipulating those systems as symbols. Are they able to portray the system as 
modern, good and efficient, and are they able to define the outcome of using such 
a system as a success? For ordinary citizens it is rather difficult to understand the 
effects of a quality assurance system for major public projects, because the system 
is complex and they lack insight and information. It may also be difficult even for 
civil servants – hence the need for someone in charge of the quality assurance 
system or the projects to interpret what is going on. When it comes to using 
symbols this gives central actors an obvious advantage. It may, for example, be 
rather difficult to determine whether a major public project has actually saved 
money or furthered more realistic budgeting because of the use of a quality 
assurance system, and here symbols may have a useful role to play.   
What is also typical for myth-related systems is that they are potentially vulnerable 
to counter-myths. This is what happened with New Public Management-related 
reforms after some time, i.e. alternative definitions of effects, with related symbols, 
were launched as counter-myths (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). In the same 
way, this would potentially enable actors who are against the quality assurance 
system, whether inside or outside the public sector, to use counter-myths either to 
attack the system as such or its effects or to try to change it.  
 
A garbage can perspective 
This perspective makes two basic observations about decision-making processes – 
most actors (like public leaders) are part-time actors, because they have attention 
and capacity problems, and in most decision-making situations the stimuli for 
action are ambiguous (March and Olsen 1976). This means that collective 
rationality and instrumentality in decision-making processes is rather low. 
Decision-makers come and go in unpredictable ways, definitions of problems and 
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solutions are ambiguous and shifting, and decision-making situations are flexible 
and subject to change.  
The metaphor used for such processes is a garbage can, meaning that decision-
making processes are organized, or disorganized, and streams and compositions of 
actors, problems, solutions and decision-making opportunities are unpredictable in 
much the same way that the contents of garbage cans are. Moreover, the cans can 
be removed and replaced in unpredictable ways. Solutions may be looking for 
problems, rather than the other way around. All this creates decision-making 
processes that have obviously anarchic features, or as it is labeled, ‘organized 
anarchy’. Some use the term ‘temporary order’ (Olsen 1988). Like the above theory 
of myths and symbols, garbage can theories also have symbolic features, because 
symbols can be used to make processes look more rational, or actors may use 
symbols to include non-decision-making factors of a social character that are not 
normally prominent in public decisions. March and Olsen (1976) emphasize that 
decision-making situations are as much social occasions as they are formal choice 
opportunities. They represent opportunities for making friends or enemies, 
allocating blame and rewards, deriving social satisfaction from making decisions, 
interpreting the past and the future, engaging in superstitious learning, etc. All this 
adds to the complexity and ambiguity of the processes. 
The instrumental perspective underscores that organizational rationality is typical 
for decision-making processes and that the limited rationality of individual actors 
in organizations is modified by the total design of the organization, whereby the 
actors are placed in an organized system of levels, units, positions and tasks (Simon 
1957). The garbage can perspective looks more into how potentially rational 
individual actors may participate in creating collective or organizational 
irrationality, because of a lack of formal organization and coordination, capacity 
problems or changing contexts. Allison (1971), in his analysis of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, uses a perspective that examines the relevance of local rationality. Separate 
organizations that are supposed to collaborate may instead compete or play down 
coordination and follow their own local rules and procedures, often leading to 
problematic or even disastrous collective results. 
There are different views on whether garbage can features of public decision-
making processes are common and desirable or not. One rather common view is 
that garbage can features are of limited significance, since many such processes 
have rather unambiguous procedures and rules, particularly concerning the 
participants. But this is less often the case with regard to problems and solutions 
(Christensen et al. 2007). Hence such a perspective is often used to focus on 
processes that have special features, such as decisions that are prolonged over a 
long period of time (like the decision on the new main airport in the Oslo area that 
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lasted around thirty-eight years), that are particularly complex or emotive, or that 
are particularly subject to fluctuations and unexpected events, etc. Major public 
projects can quite easily fit into this description. 
Whether garbage can features are desirable or not is also debatable. From one 
angle, they are potentially damaging to the rationality and instrumentality of public 
decisions and result in inefficiency, increased conflicts and loss of legitimacy. From 
another angle such features may have advantages, like creating a more open and 
innovative process. Hood (2002) has also pointed out, for example, that 
randomness is possible to design and use for control or scrutiny purposes, like 
contrived randomness in public controlling and auditing of private firms. 
The relevance of this perspective for major public projects and the quality 
assurance system should be rather obvious. In their presentation of the quality 
assurance system, Samset, Berg and Klakegg (2006: 4) state that:  
‘The Norwegian governance system was designed to improve analysis and decision-
making in the front-end phase, and particularly the interaction between the two. It was 
based on the notion that the necessary binding rules for decision-making were already in 
place; however, there were no binding rules that could ensure quality and consistency of 
analysis and decisions. In an ideal technocratic model for decision-making this would not 
be necessary. Here decision and analysis follow in a logical and chronological sequence 
that would eventually lead to the selection and go-ahead of the preferred project without 
unforeseen interventions or conflicts, as illustrated in Figure 3. In reality, the process 
may to a larger degree resemble an anarchic process affected by various stakeholders, 
which is complex, less structured and unpredictable. Analysis may be biased or 
inadequate. Decisions may be affected more by political priorities than by rational 
analysis. Political priorities may change over time. Alliances and pressures from 
individuals or groups of stakeholders may change over time. The amount of information 
is over-whelming and may be interpreted and used differently by different parties. The 
possibility for disinformation is considerable, etc.’ 
This sweeping description certainly fits in with basic characteristics of the garbage 
can perspective. One crucial question is, however, how the quality assurance 
system is able to influence or modify such potential features of project processes. 
The quality assurance system as such structures and controls the pre-project phase 
more than the actual implementation of the project, and QA1 in particular implies 
more systematic control by the top political leadership. Therefore the possibility 
exists of making major public projects overall more organized and more 
predictable. On the other hand, creating QA1 may intensify political lobbying and 
political conflicts, because it will be seen by many actors as crucial. And many of 
the stakeholders will probably try to utilize various creative strategies to influence 
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QA1 and QA2. Also significant is the use of private consultants, who may 
potentially make the pre-project phase more legitimate, but who may also increase 
the level of complexity and conflict if they disagree with the content of the 
planning documents drafted by ministries and agencies. 
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Summing up 
The content of  the analytical perspectives and their relevance can be summed up 
in the following way: 
Type of 
perspective 
Sub-elements Relevance and use of perspectives for 
the following questions 
Economic-
rational 
Principal-agent 
Public choice 
Transaction cost 
Capture 
The role of self-interest for central 
actors 
Apriori goals and unambiguous means-
end 
thinking 
The central role of political executives 
and private consultants 
Instrumental-
structural 
Hierarchical 
Negotiations 
Fulfilling main aims 
Influence pattern in the system 
Separate quality assurance system, 
adding QA1 
Structural complexity 
Quality of organizational thinking 
Cultural-
institutional 
 Role of traditional project culture 
Developing new project culture 
Environmental Technical 
Institutional 
Technical pressure to improve major 
public project planning and quality 
Quality assurance as myth and symbol 
 
Garbage can  The complexity of the quality assurance 
system 
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NPM and post-NPM reforms in a 
comparative perspective 
Main features of New Public Management reforms 
Traditionally, political and administrative systems in Western democracies are 
based on a complex set of norms and values that are balanced in different and 
often ambiguous ways. This government model, which may be labeled ‘old public 
administration’, allows for trade-offs and prioritizing between different and often 
competing values and goals (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Olsen 1997). Since the 
early 1980s, however, this multifunctional and hence complex civil service model 
has been challenged in many countries by New Public Management (NPM), which 
offers more one-dimensional solutions to complex structures and problems (Self 
2000). Most New Public Management reform efforts have had similar goals: to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, enhance the 
responsiveness of public agencies to their clients and customers, reduce public 
expenditure and improve managerial accountability (Wright 1994). The means used 
to achieve these goals have been a whole series of reforms connected to structural 
devolution – strong vertical and horizontal specialization of administrative systems, 
competitive tendering, customer choice, etc. In addition, New Public Management 
prescribes cultural changes aimed at making the government apparatus more user-
friendly and market-oriented (Christensen and Lægreid 2001).  
Even though the basis of New Public Management is rather narrow, it is actually a 
rather loose concept, encompassing several different administrative doctrines, 
inspired, in turn, by a combination of newer institutional economic theory and 
management theory (Boston et al. 1996). This makes New Public Management 
rather contradictory, for it simultaneously prescribes centralization, regulation and 
control and de-centralization, deregulation, flexibility and autonomy, with the latter 
aspects often prevailing (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). These tensions result 
from the contradiction between the centralizing tendencies (make the managers 
manage) of contractual arrangements and the de-centralizing tendencies (let the 
managers manage) of management (Boston et al. 1996, Kettl 1997).  
The implementation of New Public Management started in the early 1980s, 
primarily in Anglo-Saxon countries, like Australia and New Zealand, while the 
Scandinavian and some Continental European countries lagged behind (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004). The reasons for this difference can be explained using some of 
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the perspectives already presented. The New Public Management trail-blazers 
normally had a lot of environmental pressure, whether technical or institutional: 
New Zealand, for example, had major economic problems specifically related to its 
foreign trade. Overall, the Anglo-American countries also had polity conditions 
conducive to reforms – few constitutional constraints, or a dominant two-party 
system with an ‘elective dictatorship’, giving reform entrepreneurs a lot of leeway 
(Hood 1996). With regard to cultural factors this group is more mixed. When they 
launched the reforms New Zealand and Australia had a political-administrative 
culture that quite closely resembled the Scandinavian one, and the reforms were 
implemented by Labour parties; but rather surprisingly, political entrepreneurship 
and environmental pressure prevailed over cultural restraining factors (Aberbach 
and Christensen 2001). In the USA and the UK cultural features like individualism 
and efficiency- and market-orientation helped initiate and implement the reforms. 
Until about a decade ago Norway was seen as a reluctant reformer, mainly because 
its healthy economy produced little environmental pressure, and a series of 
minority governments made it difficult to decide on and implement reforms; this 
was further compounded by a traditionally collectivistic and efficiency-skeptical 
culture (Christensen 2003, Olsen and Peters 1996). 
 
Effects of New Public Management reforms 
It is important to distinguish between reforms and actual changes. Actual changes do 
not need to be a product or result of reforms, and reforms do not need to result in 
actual changes (Christensen et al. 2007). There are different ways to assess the 
effects of New Public Management-oriented reforms. A first, rather broad 
approach is to look at whether the reforms have changed the general decision-
making behavior and role-enactment of central political and administrative actors 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). A second, narrower 
approach examines the functioning of New Public Management-inspired 
management systems. We lean more towards the first way of measuring effects, 
but operate with an extended effect concept. Therefore, we include external 
political effects as well as internal administrative effects and technical-economic 
effects (Olsen 1996). A substantial democratic dilemma related to New Public 
Management reforms is how subordinate leaders and units, like agencies and 
commercial units, are to gain enough autonomy to function efficiently, but not so 
much freedom as to make them politically uncontrollable (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2004a).  
What were the effects of the New Public Management-inspired reforms that took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s? Did this type of reforms alter the conditions for 
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political control? The expectations from the OECD-initiated ‘official model’ 
(Pollitt et al. 2004) or ‘public interest perspective’ (James 2003) were that structural 
devolution and more managerial autonomy, combined with performance 
management, would improve performance and efficiency, without having negative 
side-effects on other values like control and democracy. The underlying argument 
was that more autonomy for managers would allow politicians to spend more time 
steering the ‘big’ issues and less time dealing with ‘small’ issues. In other words, the 
political authorities were to abstain from involvement in individual cases but at the 
same time strengthen their role as general regulators (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 
2007). However, is it possible simultaneously to give managers more freedom, 
subject them to more control by the ministries and also make them more 
responsive to consumers (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004)? Several studies show that 
this is a difficult challenge. 
The main comparative picture concerning reforms seems to be that New Public 
Management has contributed to undermining the control of political executives 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The influence of 
central administrative leaders, in ministries and particularly in agencies, has 
increased, not to mention the influence of leaders of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). The main reason for this feature is that structural devolution or vertical 
specialization has increased the distance between political executives and the 
leaders at subordinate levels and in subordinate institutions, and the levers of 
control have therefore been weakened (Egeberg 2003). Political signals are seen as 
less important at subordinate levels. There has also been a cultural change related 
to superior steering and control, implying that political leaders should stay away 
from active hands-on control. In addition, increased horizontal specialization 
between administrative units and tasks has increased fragmentation, coordination 
and capacity problems for political executives. 
For many reform entrepreneurs the most important part of New Public 
Management was to roll back the state and increase efficiency in public 
organizations (Self 2000). Very few countries have managed to cut down on the 
number of public employees through New Public Management, with New Zealand 
as one of the few examples of a temporal nature (Gregory 2001). Rather the 
tendency has been in the other direction because of a new type of public 
bureaucracy related to new control and scrutiny systems. The overall picture of 
typical New Public Management-countries is that they have not had any more 
macro-economic success than the more reluctant countries. Many economists 
argue that the efficiency of public services has increased as a result of New Public 
Management (Domberger and Jensen 1997, Domberger and Rimmer 1994, 
Sørensen, Borge and Hagen 1999), while others, including some political science 
and public administration scholars, are more skeptical and think that the results are 
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more mixed and that the efficiency gains have been primarily in areas related to 
simple, technically-oriented services, but not in more complicated ones (Boyne et 
al. 2003). 
Management by objectives and results (MBOR), which was implemented in 1990, 
became an important feature of the reluctant Norwegian reforms early on, though 
competitive tendering and privatization did not. In the early 1990s it was followed 
by a rather gradual program of structural devolution. The gradual gain in autonomy 
by the traditional agencies aroused little controversy among political and 
administrative elites, according to a study of this group (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). On the contrary, political leaders thought that this increased autonomy, 
which was controlled via the MBOR system, the yearly letter of allocation and a 
formal and informal steering dialogue, worked rather well. Moreover, 
administrative leaders in the ministries believed that increased autonomy for 
traditional agencies had been implemented as intended. The increased autonomy of 
the state-owned enterprises was more controversial, as were the partial 
privatization processes related to Statoil and Telenor. When asked, the cabinet 
members of the Bondevik I government were somewhat reluctant to accept some 
of the undermining of political control they had experienced, and did not much 
like strategic steering, even though they had mostly supported the gradual New 
Public Management-related reforms. 
 
Post-NPM reforms - why and how 
After outlining some of the main features of the first wave of New Public 
Management reforms in a comparative perspective, one could ask how the effects 
of the first generation of such reforms have influenced and fed into the second 
generation of reforms – labeled post-NPM reforms – that emerged in the late 
1990s (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). There seem to have been a number of main 
reasons for the emergence of the post-NPM reforms (Christensen 2006). One was 
that it has failed to deliver on one of the main goals of the reform, namely, 
increased efficiency, both in a micro and particularly macro way. Related to the 
emphasis on efficiency there have also been discussions in many countries about 
the decrease in the quality of public services and the costs of the reforms, such as 
increasing social inequality (Stephens 1996).  
A second reason was the increased fragmentation that resulted from the New 
Public Management reforms. Political executives, whether on the left or right of 
the political spectrum, became increasingly skeptical towards the increasing 
challenges of coordination and capacity and the undermining of political control 
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and wanted to ‘bring the system back together again’ (Gregory 2003). A third 
reason was the fear factor, prompted by an increasingly insecure world. Most 
typically this has been related to the effects of 9/11 and the increase of political 
control introduced to counter the terrorist threat, particularly in the USA, Australia 
and the UK (Kettl 2004). In addition the fears created by the large tsunami, 
pandemics like SARS and bird flu, and national concerns related to the latter, like 
bio-security concerns in New Zealand, have also pointed to a renewed need for 
greater integration and coordination (Christensen and Painter 2004). So it has been 
increasingly easy to argue for more central political and administrative control. 
So how can one characterize the content of the post-NPM reforms in a 
comparative perspective? In many countries New Public Management has created 
a highly disaggregated and de-centralized apparatus for pursuing public goals. 
Many political systems are now trying to ‘rebuild’ the state or at least create more 
central governance capacity within the state (Christensen and Lægreid 2006, 
Halligan 2006). According to Shergold (2004), ‘there is a tendency to bureaucratic 
fragmentation’. Terms like ‘joined-up government’, ‘whole-of-government’, 
‘reassertion of the centre’ and ‘horizontal management’ are often used to describe 
moves towards greater coherence in the post-NPM era. But what do these terms 
mean? Often they are used interchangeably, and different terms are used in 
different parts of the world, for example ‘joined-up government’ in the UK and 
‘whole-of-government’ in Australia (Christensen and Lægreid 2006, Hunt 2005). 
The terms are new, but they have been coined to address old problems concerning 
co-ordination and control.  
In addition, the term ‘whole-of-government’ can have different meanings: a whole-
of-government approach may be comprehensive or specific, formal or informal; it 
may take place at different organizational levels and involve policymaking and/or 
implementation. However, there are some elements that are common to all 
frameworks where whole-of-government is involved. Generally speaking, whole-
of-government seems to be more about informal than formal collaboration, and a 
whole-of-government approach brings together different stakeholders in specific 
policy areas. Moreover, departmentalism is considered to be the opposite of 
whole-of-government, for whole-of-government involves collaboration across 
organizational boundaries and therefore implies first and foremost horizontal 
collaboration, in contrast to departmentalism (Hunt 2005, Richards and Kavanagh 
2000). Nevertheless, vertical and hierarchical aspects are also discernible in the 
concept of whole-of-government. One of its aims is to better equip civil servants 
to handle ‘wicked’ issues that cut across policy areas, by reducing tunnel vision and 
‘vertical silos’ (Bogdanor 2005). Bakvis and Juillet (2004) capture some important 
elements when they state that ‘horizontal management can be defined as the 
coordination and management of a set of activities between two or more 
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organizational units, where the units in question do not have hierarchical control 
over each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that cannot be 
achieved by units working in isolation’.  
Reorganization of public activity in Norway over the last ten years has been 
characterized by a gradual move away from an integrated state and towards a more 
fragmented one. Nevertheless, Norway still lags somewhat behind the Anglo-
American New Public Management pioneers. One of the main features of the 
Norwegian reforms has been increased structural devolution, whereby ordinary 
agencies have been given more autonomy, without changing their formal status, 
but several of them have also been transformed into state-owned companies 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The main reform strategy in Norway has been to 
avoid privatization by concentrating on structural devolution within the public 
sector (Christensen and Lægreid 2004). Another New Public Management-inspired 
reform was the reform of the hospital system. In 2002 responsibility for 
Norwegian hospitals was transferred from the counties to central government. 
Ownership was thereby centralized to the state. The reform also set up new 
management principles for the hospitals based on a de-centralized enterprise 
model (Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2006, Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2005).  
After the general election in 2001, the incoming Conservative-Centre minority 
government, dominated by the Conservative Party, embarked on a more radical 
New Public Management-inspired reform agenda, at the same time as countries 
like New Zealand were moving away from certain elements of New Public 
Management. The agenda imitated the main features of the New Zealand reform 
agenda in the 1980s, assigning a prominent role to structural devolution, ‘single-
purpose organizations’, competitive tendering, efficiency measures, consumer 
choice, decentralizing service provision, etc. (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007).  
The most controversial reform attempt between 2001 and 2005 was the reform of 
the regulatory agencies. In 2003 the government put forward a White Paper to the 
Storting (St. meld. nr. 17 – (2002–2003) proposing changes in regulatory agencies. 
The recommendation from the OECD (2003) was to separate the regulatory 
function from the commercial and other functions. In addition, it recommended 
reducing the potential for ministerial intervention, by making agencies more 
autonomous and professional – a standpoint very much inspired by the economic-
rational perspective presented. Evidence-based decision-making was to replace 
consensus-based decision-making, with advice on specific decisions being provided 
by expert appeal bodies outside the political system (Christensen and Lægreid 
2004). The White Paper took on board the OECD’s mantra that it was important 
to face future challenges, even though there were no major problems with the way 
regulatory agencies worked. The result of the negotiating process in the Stortinget 
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was a mixed solution (Hommen 2003). Although the government got support for 
moving eight regulatory agencies out of Oslo, it had to agree to a number of 
compromises on the formal changes. The Stortinget stated that appeals should not 
be moved out of the ministries for the time being and that proposed changes 
concerning other aspects of the regulatory agencies should be made only on a case-
by-case basis and not in a general and sweeping way. Thus, the eventual solution 
was a hybrid one. 
Even though the Conservative-Centre government was very eager to pursue typical 
New Public Management reforms, its record in actually implementing them was 
rather mixed. It eagerly pushed for getting local authorities to establish ‘one-stop 
shops’ for local service provision and to proceed with a broad program for 
converting public administration agencies into state-owned companies. The 
agencies affected included such areas as road construction, the airport 
administration and the agency for government administrative development. In the 
sphere of immigration, however, a decision was taken to bring the immigration 
authorities back under closer government control, which went against the grain of 
the regulatory agency reform (Christensen and Lægreid 2005, Christensen, Lægreid 
and Ramslien 2006).  
The new Employment and Welfare Administration established from 2006 is in 
some ways a typical post-NPM reform, but also has elements from New Public 
Management. The aim of the new administration is to get more people working 
and active and fewer on benefits, and to provide a more co-ordinated, user-friendly 
and efficient employment and welfare administration (Christensen, Fimreite and 
Lægreid 2006). The Labour Market Administration and National Insurance Service 
have now been merged in a new central agency and are to collaborate with locally 
based social services in local work- and welfare-offices (St. prp. nr. 46 (2004–
2005)). This is one of the largest reforms ever in Norway and includes elements of 
New Public Management, like structural rationalization and increased efficiency, 
but it also has some stronger major ideas related to post-NPM, namely the 
coordination and collaboration of large public service organizations. By 
introducing a more complex, multi-purpose organization the reform goes against 
the idea of the single-purpose organization and the new organization will also 
potentially increase central political and administrative control. 
Before the national election in 2005 the Labour Party formed an alliance with the 
Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party. This alliance ran pretty much on an anti-
NPM ticket arguing that such reforms should be stopped or modified because of 
their negative consequences, such as reduced political control, more fragmentation 
and too much focus on efficiency. This view was particularly interesting coming 
from the Labour Party, which had previously been seen as supporting New Public 
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Management. The alliance won the election and formed a Red-Green government. 
The crucial question now is whether the anti-NPM rhetoric will remain just 
rhetoric or whether it will result in major changes. In the course of its nearly two 
years in power the government has started to modify or stop some of the New 
Public Management-style reforms, like limiting the influence of the competition 
agency, allowing some major mergers in the private sector, limiting the spread of 
private schools, limiting the scope of private providers in the health service, 
pursuing a more active ownership policy towards state-owned enterprises. etc. 
What this will eventually add up to is not easy to imagine now, but it probably will 
not amount to much more than a rebalancing of the New Public Management 
reforms in a post-NPM direction (Christensen and Lie 2007). The PM Jens 
Stoltenberg pretty much sums up this somewhat ambiguous rebalancing in the title 
of an article he published in 2006 – ‘modernized renewal’ (Stoltenberg 2006). 
 
Whole-of-government according to the perspectives outlined 
Viewing the situation from an economic-rational perspective it is interesting to 
note that one major argument for New Public Management reforms still prevails in 
the post-NPM reforms, i.e. the emphasis on efficiency. How both a fragmented 
public structure and a more integrated structure can both improve efficiency is not 
that easy to understand, showing that this way of thinking is rather underdeveloped 
concerning the relationship between organizational design of public structures and 
efficiency (see Boston et al. 1996). Another observation is that things have changed 
concerning the mix of centralizing and decentralizing elements in the reforms. 
While New Public Management typically has tended towards managerial-style 
thinking with regard to devolution and decentralization, post-NPM is informed to 
a greater extent by the more centralizing ideas in new institutional economic theory 
related to control through contracts. If we applied the principal-agent theory, we 
would argue that the controlling concerns of the principal are now stronger than 
the autonomy concerns of the agent, autonomy that New Public Management 
argues serves to increase efficiency and keep the political executive at arms-length.   
Seen from an instrumental-structural perspective, the post-NPM reforms are 
primarily about structural redesign or reorganization. The reforms are seen as a 
reaction to increased fragmentation under New Public Management, brought 
about by increased vertical structural devolution or specialization and increased 
horizontal specialization via the principle of single-purpose organizations 
(Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). Post-NPM is very much about reversing 
those tendencies. Agencies and SOEs have been given a shorter leash by 
reinvigorating the instrumental hierarchical levers of the political executive, and 
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some of them have even been dissolved or have changed their formal status, as in 
Australia and New Zealand (Halligan 2007). In addition, there is some horizontal 
integration going on, not so much through mergers and structural integration as 
through somewhat looser structures like intra-sectoral or cross-sectoral 
cooperation, networks, programs, projects, ‘tsars’ etc. And the political and 
administrative leadership has also tried to combine vertical and horizontal 
coordinative measures. 
Compared to the New Public Management reforms the post-NPM reforms are 
generally more about cultural than structural features. While the New Public 
Management reforms offered structural solutions that also fragmented the 
political-administrative culture and catered to sub-cultures, the post-NPM reforms 
have not only focused more on holistic structural solutions, but also on holistic 
cultural solutions. Now the mantra is to think about the collectivity and to find 
ways to collaborate with other public entities to find good solutions (see Bardach 
1998). And the focus on public ethos and standards is now more important than 
before (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). In Australia the focus is on what is called 
‘value-based management’, where collaboration and unity are seen as more 
important than competition and fragmentation. 
The environmental perspective can also help to explain some features of the post-
NPM reforms. The technical environment has in many ways changed. There has 
been increasing criticism from stakeholders in the environment that New Public 
Management has failed to deliver instrumental and efficiency gains (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2007). The political executive has increasingly had the feeling that 
through New Public Management it has lost potential levers of control and 
influence, and that it would like to have some of them back in order to cope with 
increasing challenges in the environment – obviously 9/11 is a major 
environmental challenge, as are concerns about tsunamis, pandemics/national 
epidemics or bio-security (Kettl 2004). 
The institutional environment is part of the equation concerning post-NPM. For a 
long time New Public Management ideology and ideas dominated completely 
among the major political and administrative stakeholders, and also in the media. 
That is no longer the case. More and more criticism has been directed at New 
Public Management, partly because of increasing frustration among political 
leaders about their lack of control and capacity, but also because of negative 
experiences reported in the media, and also increasing worries about threats and 
insecurity. All this has increased the importance of counter-myths opposing New 
Public Management. It is now much more appropriate to talk about bringing the 
political-administrative system back together again and to criticize New Public 
Management. 
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The garbage can perspective is also relevant, in at least two respects. One angle is 
that when post-NPM reforms are introduced, the mixture of different structural 
and cultural elements becomes more complex, opening up the possibilities for 
increased ambiguity and confusion in public decision-making processes. It is also 
interesting to follow the major arguments and thoughts behind post-NPM. They 
are not only characterized by technical arguments about restructuring, but also by 
symbols about the advantages of coordination and integration (Gregory 2003). 
Thus post-NPM has similar features to the New Public Management reforms. 
Both types of reforms are partly characterized by ambiguous organizational 
thinking, and as mentioned, the contradictory and strong arguments about 
efficiency also underscore this feature. 
 
Norway in the broader reform picture 
As stated, until the end of the 1990s Norway was a typical reluctant reformer in a 
comparative perspective. It was primarily seen as reluctant relative to the main 
international trend represented by the Anglo-American countries, which from the 
early 1980s embarked on a New Public Management path. With regard to reforms 
Norway displays similar features to the other Nordic countries and to some 
Continental European countries, like Germany and France (Christensen 2004). 
The Norwegian reform profile is characterized by New Public Management reform 
rhetoric in two reform programs during the late 1980s, but actual implementation 
of such reforms did not take place until the 1990s, and even then it did so in a 
gradual and slow way, choosing more moderate reform elements. The main 
reasons for this were that Norway had relatively little pressure from the 
environment to reform, the economic situation was (and still is) good, the 
historical-cultural tradition was not very  compatible with New Public 
Management, and two decades of minority government gave little instrumental 
potential (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Added to this was the typically 
Scandinavian style of collaborating with interest groups/civil service unions that 
were skeptical towards New Public Management. 
Norway pursued a more radical New Public Management path in the period 2001-
2005, because the government of that period was more ideologically open to such 
a path, thus bringing Norway closer to the situation in the Anglo-American 
countries (Christensen, Lie and Lægreid 2007). This development took place, 
however, in a period when those countries had already started to embark on a 
post-NPM path. Since the new Red-Green government came to power in 2005, 
the rhetoric has become more anti-NPM and some of the action is also in that 
direction. 
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The quality assurance system and elements of New Public 
Management and post-NPM reforms 
Quality systems in public or private organizations, whether they are called quality 
assurance, quality assessment, quality review, quality-at-entry, quality standards, or 
quality steering, are nothing new and they in many ways pre-date New Public 
Management (Hallandvik 2005). It is, however, probably fair to say that quality 
systems have focused more on quality in projects or established organizations after 
a formal decision has been taken and the implementation is going on or is finished, 
than on quality in the planning and pre-decision phase with which the quality 
assurance system is concerned. The QA2 phase of the quality assurance system in 
Norway seems to be the most traditional one, while the QA1 does not seem to 
have many counterparts in the public sector in other countries. The main question 
here is whether the quality assurance system in Norway contains elements from 
New Public Management and/or post-NPM reform measures. 
Overall, quality systems can be defined in both a New Public Management and 
post-NPM direction. One of the central goals or promises of New Public 
Management is to increase efficiency and quality in the public sector, so quality is a 
central part of the concept. Understood as a technical aspect of reforms, quality 
systems are supposed to be furthered through a greater focus on independent 
professional competence, more structural specialization and clearer roles, increased 
transparency in public decisions and activities, increased participation by users of 
public services, etc. One question that arises is how easy it is to further efficiency 
and quality at the same time, but also the consistency and trade-offs between the 
other aspects could be discussed (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Accordingly, 
some see quality systems as symbolic systems, where it is important for political 
and administrative leaders to manipulate myths and as part of a kind of impression 
management, aimed at selling or even over-selling reforms. 
But quality systems can also very much be seen as control systems, either ex ante, 
like the Norwegian quality assurance system, or ex post control. As underscored, 
New Public Management is a concept that advocates both devolution and 
regulation at the same time, i. e. it is often said that there is a dynamic relationship 
in the concept between ‘let the managers manage’, the autonomy part, and ‘make 
the managers manage’, the incentive and control part (Kettl 1997). But this feature, 
which is related to contract theory in new institutional economic theory, may also 
be seen as an inconsistent or ambiguous feature of New Public Management. 
What is very typical for post-NPM is that it puts more emphasis on the control 
part than New Public Management, thus tilting the balance between autonomy and 
control. In post-NPM there are not only restructuring measures, implying more 
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control by political and administrative leaders, but also overall more control, 
scrutiny, audit and reporting systems. So quality systems, like the quality assurance 
system in Norway, may primarily be defined as a post-NPM ex ante control or 
regulation system. The control part is particularly evident in the QA1 phase.  
If we look more closely at the Norwegian quality assurance system we see that 
overall it is built on the idea that it’s good to ‘stop and think’ (Lave and March 
1992) about major projects before central actors decide on them, i.e. particularly to 
give them more of  broad societal-based cost-benefit analyses. The hope is that by 
doing this better and more needed projects will be chosen, budgets would become 
more realistic and money will be saved on the projects that are chosen, and the 
overall quality of the projects will be improved. This could very much be 
interpreted as addressing rational calculation and improving organizational 
thinking, so that the coupling between goals, the projects chosen and expected 
effects becomes tighter. But a quality assurance system also very much implying a 
political process in which different actors and stakeholders are involved. As already 
mentioned, the quality assurance system is organized in two phases, whereby the 
first phase (QA1) is more open to hierarchical political steering or political 
negotiations, while the QA2 phase is potentially more of a technocratic phase 
dominated by professional expertise. After QA2, when the project proposal 
reaches the Storting, the process may become more politically oriented and open 
again. 
One feature of the Norwegian quality assurance system that is very typical of New 
Public Management is the bringing in of external consultants to improve the 
quality of preparatory planning documents for major public projects, whether it is 
seen as vertical specialization or alliances with actors in the private sector (see 
Hodge and Greve 2005 for the literature on Public-Private Partnerships). When 
New Public Management started twenty-five years ago, rolling back the state, 
devolution, competitive tendering, privatization, etc. were typical features 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001). It was also asserted that if the public sector did 
not produce high-quality and efficient services, it would be better to leave it to the 
private sector, either through competitive tendering or privatization. Later on 
bench-marking was introduced, urging public organizations to compare themselves 
with and learn from the private sector. All of this has an anti-political flavor, and 
also smacks of skepticism towards the professional competence of the public 
sector. The thinking in New Public Management ideology was obviously that the 
decisions made and the services produced would become better and more 
professional if the political executive stayed away from them and private sector 
expertise was brought in. 
51 
So how does the Norwegian quality assurance system measure up to such a view? 
First, bringing in external consultants as experts obviously has features of this 
view. This measure can be seen as a technical device to improve the projects and as 
such an instrument that implies greater trust in competitive external expertise than 
in the expertise of the ministries and agencies, or simply that internal expertise is 
lacking. If this can be shown to work in practice, it may enhance the legitimacy of 
the political and administrative leadership; however, it could also be a symbolic 
feature whose effects are difficult to prove and which will increase internal 
conflicts in the central civil service, because it could be seen as mistrust towards 
internal expertise. A less dramatic view would be to emphasize that the external 
expertise is there to help and supplement the internal expertise and political and 
administrative leaders. 
Second, had the quality assurance system consisted only of QA2, an argument of 
influential external experts would have been easier to advance, since one alternative 
would have been to keep the whole QA2 process inside the central civil service. 
But the introduction of QA1 has changed this picture, not so much because of the 
use of external experts provided for in this phase, but because of the tighter 
coupling of the political and administrative leadership to this phase. So one crucial 
question is how the QA1 phase changes the overall quality assurance system. Does 
it really mean more political control and influence relative to in-house and external 
expertise, and in that case is it the Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office or Ministry of 
Finance that has gained influence? Is it about increasing the influence of 
administrative leaders, for example in the Ministry of Finance, on the processes 
related to major projects, and decreasing that of the sectoral ministries and 
agencies engaged in planning the projects? 
Third, if the effect of the quality assurance system is to increase political and 
administrative influence and control over major public projects, this would very 
much be in line with post-NPM reform features. If that is true, it would probably 
be related to the QA1 phase. The fact that the quality assurance system takes a lot 
of time could, however, both bring in more stakeholders and make the decision-
making process more complex, so that the time and resources used up front and ex 
ante could have a potential negative effect on both political control and the 
efficiency of the projects. 
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The quality assurance system – main 
features, effects, alternatives and 
improvements 
The main features of the quality assurance system analyzed 
Bringing together the analytical perspectives presented and the main features of 
comparative public reforms gives us some good instruments to understand the 
design of the Norwegian quality assurance system. The system is a rather complex 
and somewhat hybrid system and we will try to sum up and analyze its main 
elements. 
First, the plain fact that such a system focusing on the front-end phase of the 
projects has been established is interesting in itself, but it is not all that clear what 
kind of phenomenon it represents in the public sector. It may be seen as a pre-
project control and regulation device, an ex ante planning instrument or an ex ante 
quality-assurance system. Whether these distinctions are of any major relevance 
when analyzing the system is another question, and we focus on the system as such 
without labeling it in any definite way. The pure fact that this is a separate system, 
composed of mandatory procedures and rules and involving certain actors, is 
interesting, because it signals that this type of system is held to be better than an 
integrated system where quality assurance is either taken care of in an in-house 
administrative unit or separately in each ministry/agency involved in major public 
projects. Since it involves private actors it also bears some resemblance to the 
increasingly popular public-private partnerships (see Hodge and Greve 2005), 
although it is not, of course, a public-private partnership for financing and 
implementing major public projects but for adding external expertise. 
Second, one important rationale of the quality assurance system is to have more 
realistic budgets, a typical motive according to an economic-rational perspective 
and one that is central to understanding New Public Management reforms. The 
establishment of the quality assurance system reflects increasing worries in the 
public leadership about the costs of major public projects. Reducing the costs 
through the quality assurance system could potentially happen in a number of 
different ways: choosing a lower-cost alternative, scaling back the project, 
improving the technical quality of the planning, devising strategies for 
implementation, including cost-saving proposals concerning providers, etc. The 
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crucial point, however, is what potential designing a quality assurance system offers 
in itself. We will return to this later on in our discussion of effects. 
Third, the instrumental-structural perspective is the one best able to explain the 
complexity of the quality assurance system. One point is that is has centralizing 
elements in the anchoring of the system in the Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office 
and primarily the Ministry of Finance. It involves the relevant ministries and 
agencies because they provide the mandatory planning documents for the quality 
assurance system, but it also formally weakens their position, because the front-end 
phase of their projects is partly ‘taken over’ by other actors. This feature is very 
typical of post-NPM, i.e., it is concerned with central control and coordination. So 
this the political aspect of QA1 is strong, and the aim is that the top political 
executives should be involved early in the process, to put the project in a broader 
societal perspective, and try to control other potential actors.  
Interestingly enough, another important feature is the lack of formality, because 
there are some procedures that imply indirect regulation through the involvement 
of external consultants. So centralization and features of delegation to private 
actors go hand in hand. The private consultants are prequalified so there is a 
control element in that; on the other hand, this is potentially modified by the 
power of the ministries/agencies to choose among a selected few. 
Fourth, the use of private consultants is the most notable feature of the quality 
assurance system. These consultants are primarily brought in to improve the 
quality of the planning documents and participate in reducing costs and create 
realistic budgets. In an ideal world they should make professionally oriented and 
good analyses of the planning documents of the proposals, be value neutral, and 
deliver solid conclusions. But in the real world they are also at the same time 
participants in a public decision-making process, where their participation may 
change the pattern of influence among the public actors and influence the 
evaluation alternatives and basic decision premises, something we will come back 
to. The role of the private consultants is obviously potentially more political in the 
QA1 phase than in the QA2 phase, where their professional role seems to be 
clearer. It is interesting that the argument for adding the QA1 phase was more to 
strengthen society-related choices and economic considerations, and anchor those 
choices and considerations more in the political leadership, than to improve the 
professional quality of the projects and thus reduce costs. Why the private 
consultants should also participate in the QA1 phase is not all that evident, but this 
is also something we will discuss below. The distinction between the QA1 and 
QA2 phases could also have been defined more clearly in this respect. 
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Culturally speaking, New Public Management is very much geared to learning from 
the private sector, whether this learning involves a management orientation, more 
emphasis on efficiency and quality, or more service orientation, but also about 
bench-marking and best practice (Boston et al. 1996). Basically, it is held that the 
public sector should learn from the private sector, not the other way around. When 
it comes to structural fragmentation, it is appropriate to attend to sub-cultures like 
professional cultures. The quality assurance system has some of these features. 
Bringing in private consultants reflects an orientation that stresses the importance 
of learning from the private sector, particularly large firms, the implication being 
that these people have superior planning and quality assurance competence. But a 
crucial question is what kind of culture will emerge as a result of the quality 
assurance system, and how much private consultants will influence this culture. 
Will adding the QA1 phase make it a more holistic culture, inspired by post-NPM 
reforms, or create cultural inconsistency and tension? The probability for the first 
option may have something to do with how consistent the private experts are 
acting and furthering a new control culture, making the public actors learn and 
socialize to this culture, something that is worth studying further. The potential for 
conflicts and cultural heterogeneity is also there, particularly between the external 
experts and the sectoral ministries and agencies proposing the major public 
projects.  Lack of compatibility between the expertise and culture of the private 
experts could also be an issue. 
Fifth, in the New Public Management reforms there was a greater focus on 
efficiency gains than in the post-NPM reforms, even though both reform waves 
argue that they further efficiency. Accordingly, technical external pressure on 
major public projects seems to have been important for developing the quality 
assurance system. While it is natural to try to reduce costs in major public projects, 
because the money saved may be used for other purposes, a more crucial issue is 
whether it was necessary to introduce the quality assurance system to cope with 
these problems. Thus, a potential tension is built into the system between the 
sectoral ministries, particularly the ones with major public projects, the 
Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, and the private 
consultants. Whether this tension decreased after establishing the system, against 
opposition, or increased with the introduction of QA1, is a question we will come 
back to. 
The rhetoric of the quality assurance system, reflecting pressure from the 
institutional environment, resembles New Public Management rhetoric in the sense 
that it emphasizes cost-benefit analyses and efficiency gains. In addition symbols 
connected to structural devolution and the importance of independent 
professional competence are typical for both New Public Management and the 
Norwegian quality assurance system. But when QA1 was added the symbols 
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changed somewhat, pointing more towards the demand and need for more central 
political control and broader societal considerations when planning major public 
projects. These are all arguments that are very much typical for post-NPM reform 
rhetoric. 
Sixth, describing the quality assurance system as a complex decision-making system 
may also imply garbage can elements. Even though the decision-making structure 
– the structure of participants – is fixed in the quality assurance procedures and 
rules, this structure provides for potential disagreement between different interests. 
The access structure – the structure of problems and solutions – is less fixed, as is 
normally the case in the public sector, and may be diverse if the different actors 
define the problems and solutions in divergent ways. This is an alternative to 
describing the quality assurance as formally well organized and predictable. 
 
Potential effects of the quality assurance system 
An effects analysis of the quality assurance system based on an economic-rational 
perspective may simply ask whether the introduction of the system has yielded 
efficiency and more realistic budgets. If this is the case, as might be evidenced, for 
example, by studies of major public projects exposed to quality assurance, one 
could then ask what kind of mechanisms are involved. Are the gains produced by 
introducing a system that encourages a more careful consideration of major public 
projects? Are the centralizing elements crucial or is it the structural devolution and 
professional competence that are important? What about the involvement of 
external experts? What type of expertise or professional models are most 
promising? These are relevant, but often difficult questions to answer. And of 
course there may be other perspectives and logics of action involved as well, rather 
than just the purely economic, technical or managerial ones. It may, for example, 
be the simple fact that major public projects have been changed in the process that 
has made them different or that other environmental factors, like international 
constraints or national conditions like changing provider conditions, have been 
crucial and not the quality assurance system. 
Using the structural-instrumental perspective and several New Public Management 
and post-NPM studies, it is possible to make some inferences about some of the 
potential effects of the structural design of the quality assurance system. Compared 
to a more integrated system of quality assurance for major public projects, one can 
draw some rather simple conclusions about the quality assurance system, namely 
that the new system will give the Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of 
Finance and private consulting firms potentially more influence and the sectoral 
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ministries and agencies planning and implementing the projects potentially less 
influence, because the whole system and particularly the QA1 is typically an top-
down effort. The simple rationale here is that the former actors are central and 
organized into the process, while the latter actors have a formally weaker position. 
Among the ‘winners’, it is not all that clear about the relative effects. One option 
would be to conclude that the main story is that the political and administrative 
executives in the central units involved are the winners, because they will dominate 
QA1 and therefore control the involvement of both the administrative leadership 
and the private consultants. Another scenario might be that it is the central 
administrative leaders running the system who are the winners, or a third one that 
the external consultants will gain a lot of influence deep inside the central public 
apparatus. Another, more open question is whether there are some systemic 
features here or whether the pattern of influence will vary between different 
processes. Because it is a complex system with different and partly inconsistent 
structural elements, it is also likely that all the different actors on the winners’ side 
will gain influence, but to a different degree. 
When the quality assurance system was established in 2000, it started a new 
tradition or cultural path. What the content of this new culture is all about is not 
obvious. With QA2 the culture probably tended in the direction of a private 
planning and quality assurance culture, while QA1, with its post-NPM emphasis on 
central control and coordination, probably to some extent counteracted this. If we 
look at the tension between the old and more internally related quality assurance 
culture and the new culture, it is probably safe to say that the old one has been 
weakened. But that may also imply that there is cultural resistance in the ministries 
and agencies with major projects, something that may modify the intended effects 
of the quality assurance system. 
The external technical environment of the quality assurance system is a complex 
combination of public and private actors trying to influence the definition and 
selection of major public projects, but also to position themselves in a tug-of-war 
for political and administrative influence. It is not all that clear, aside from the 
hope of improving the realism of budgets of major public projects and generally 
improving the quality of the projects, how the quality assurance system will 
influence the selection and content of the projects. That is more related to 
comparative case design. What is rather evident is that the introduction of the 
quality assurance system, and particularly the QA1 part, was meant to change the 
structure of these decision-making processes and that this has probably also 
happened in practice. One aim of the new system was to move away from a 
traditional bottom-up process related to the projects, where alliances between local 
stakeholders, sectoral administrative leaders and some central politicians had a 
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tendency to restrict the options and choices for the government. The new system 
changes this pattern and gives central political and administrative actors relatively 
more influence; very much in a post-NPM way. 
But what about the effects of some of the rhetoric and symbols connected to the 
quality assurance system? One winning formula is, of course, to promise that the 
system will create more efficiency and budget realism, a goal that can hardly be 
disputed. Whether this is actually true or not is not that important in a complex 
world, as long as the major argument is accepted. Another question is how the 
money saved should be used. If it helps to realize more public projects, the quality 
assurance symbols may eventually lead to more support for the system from the 
actors with the most major public projects, like the ministries of defense and 
transport/communications. This would then have softened resistance towards the 
system, at least from these actors. 
Another part of the quality assurance system rhetoric is the symbols connected to 
the involvement of external consultants. The more or less implicit argument here is 
that bringing in private actors in the front-end phase will improve the quality of 
major public projects. This is, however, much more tricky to sell broadly in the 
central administrative apparatus, because it implies a lack of trust in internal 
expertise and potentially undermines the influence of internal actors. But there 
could be more of an external effect here for the firms. Their job with the major 
projects in the public sector could be seen as some kind of branding for them that 
is giving them advantages concerning other jobs for the public sector, but also 
prestige in the broader market, creating a stronger market position in other 
segments. 
Last, the more garbage can-related features of the quality assurance system, related 
to complexity and ambiguity, may have both advantages and disadvantages 
concerning effects. The advantages are that the quality assurance system could be 
seen as an invention and innovation that has improved project processes, so it is 
not that important if not all the elements in the system add up. An alternative view 
is that the quality assurance system is too complex and ambiguous and that the 
effects are uncertain and fluctuating. 
 
Improvements and alternatives 
Talking about improvements and alternatives to the existing quality assurance 
system may mean different things. One is to take as a point of departure the 
original aims of reducing costs and have more realistic projects, to change the basic 
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decision-making processes through which major public projects are decided on, 
and improve the professional quality of planning. One may ask whether there is 
possible to improve the system even more, taken for granted that the quality 
assurance system is working better then the old system, or ask whether there are 
possible alternatives that could be better according to the aims. Another angle, that 
could cover parts of the first, is to ask how we could see improvements or 
alternatives based on the five models or perspectives outlined. 
Based on the rational perspective, public decision-making should have clear apriori 
goals and intentions, as a basis for evaluating both the broader or narrower 
economic aspects of major public projects. One can ask whether this is really the 
case now with the quality assurance system or whether there is a need for 
improvement. One way would be eventually to formalize the quality assurance 
system more, by defining the system more clearly through a set of strengthened 
formal rules and procedures, instead of the rather broad formal frames existing 
today. In this regard it would also be pertinent to state more clearly what the goals 
and main intentions of the system are, how these intentions can be implemented 
through the different elements of the system, and to point to relevant studies and 
experience that show that the effects are probably in accordance with the goals and 
intentions. Even though the Concept program plays an important role in this 
respect, this function could be strengthened.2  One critique towards such a 
proposal could of course be that formal rules and frames potentially already are 
there, whether one talk about the economy steering rules or planning and 
evaluation rules, but that they are too general and not much used. If this is the 
case, more clarifying the goals and rules close to major public projects could be 
preferable. Another aspect that is also related to the structural perspective, is 
whether it is necessary to improve the quality of the organizational thinking in the 
quality assurance system, for example in the quality and realism of the alternatives 
in the QA1 phase. 
Another aspect is whether there is possible to improve the principle-agent 
relationship in the quality assurance system. One such relationship is the one 
                                                            
2   For information about the Concept program, see 
www.concept.ntnu.no/index_engelsk.htm. There are also two collegial bodies connected 
to the quality assurance system: The forum for the project owners – the ministries – that is 
trying to clarify concepts and principles across sectors, and the forum for project 
leadership – with the relevant agencies involved ‐ that is working on identifying and 
spreading best practice for handling major public projects. The Concept program follows 
the development on these two arenas as part of its developmental work. 
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between the political-administrative leadership and the sector ministries and 
agencies; another is the one between the political-administrative executives and the 
private, external consultants. If we take it for granted that the actors proposing 
major public projects try to further biased information to the principal, whether 
intentional or not, there seems at least to be three potential changes to be made. 
One is to do something with the sectoral ministries or agencies. They could either 
be given more resources to improve their own planning and the proposals on 
major projects they further, or their role in the process be even more restricted. 
The other measure could be to increase the resources of the Cabinet/Prime 
Minister’s Office or particularly the Ministry of Finance directed towards the 
project process, to strengthen the principal and to counteract the influence of the 
sector actor or the private experts. A third measure could be to either increase the 
role of private consultants, to counteract the influence of the sectoral actors, or 
diminish their role to strengthen the principal. If one trusts the sectoral ministries 
and agencies and their proposals more this would not be a major problem, but it 
could anyhow be an idea to strengthen their planning expertise. 
The structural perspective will very much attend to whether the quality assurance 
system is structured in such a way that it’s fulfilling the general aims, whether 
explicit or not. More efforts could be used to clarify the relative importance of the 
top political and administrative decision-making premises on the one hand and the 
sectoral and ‘local’ ones on the other hand. There could also be more discussion 
and clarification of the relative importance of the political and administrative 
decision-making premises on the one hand, and the professional premises on the 
other hand, whether internal or external. One central feature with the system is 
that it is complex or hybrid, so one improvement could be to make the system 
simpler. Simplification could be to see whether the QA1 and QA2 phases could be 
merged or at least simplified in certain ways, or the role of the private consultants 
made more limited, for example connected to QA2, or establishing a rule saying 
that no firm could participate both in QA1 and QA2. 
The structural perspective will also very much attend to the pattern of influence in 
the quality assurance system. One consideration could be whether the effect of the 
system, despite the QA1, is that the political leadership has too little influence, and 
that this is a democratic concern. An improvement based on this would be to limit 
or cut the participation of the private experts, as mentioned above, or to bring in 
even more the political executives into the QA1 process. The latter would also 
balance more the role of the political and administrative executives in the process. 
If the concern is not the political leadership’s role, but more the professional role 
of the external experts, one improvement could be to increase the resources in the 
Ministry of Finance, so that control of the experts and that they stick too their 
professional role could be improved. Strengthening the resources in a quality 
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assurance unit in the Ministry of Finance could improve the purchaser competence 
of the principal, so that it’s easier to detect whether the experts have done a bad 
professional job. The experts in Ministry of Finance are also a filter between the 
private experts and the political executives. This would also reassure more those 
that are skeptical towards the private experts and fear that they are playing a 
political role in the quality assurance process. If the concern is about the 
independence of control, and there is skepticism about the external experts in this 
role, one could eventually establish an independent control and scrutiny body for 
major public projects. 
Following on from the above points, more resources could be used to compare the 
planning expertise of the ministries/agencies and that of the external consultants, 
to find out whether their expertise is competing, supplementary or similar. 
Competing expertise could create tensions, but also introduce further dynamics to 
the planning of major public projects. Supplementary expertise, which seems to be 
the most important feature of the system, would create a need to decide how to 
balance the different types of expertise, possibly readjusting the mix between them. 
If the expertise turns out to be similar this would make it rather difficult to 
legitimize the participation of the external experts. Related to this, it’s an 
interesting question whether the external experts primarily is digging into the 
procedures of quality in planning or whether their participation is more related to 
the securing quality of the content of the planning documents. In principle the 
external experts should enact a control of realities and content, and not having a 
check-list mentality or attend mostly to procedural features, but the reality could 
deviate from this. The system as such is, however, containing a lot of procedures 
about how one is working with quality control.  
Transparency in public decision-making processes could be understood both from 
a cultural perspective and from an institutional environment angle. Transparency is 
important both for legitimacy of the decision process, but also for revealing 
pattern of influence. Both these aspects have instrumental features, but primarily 
combine basic ethical and symbolic features. Potentially, the transparency could be 
improved in the quality assurance system, giving the public more insight into the 
process. One improvement could be to make better known the basic rules and 
procedures of the system, another to make public both the QA1 and QA2 reports, 
not only the latter. The concerns of secrecy would of course have to be taken into 
considerations if such changes were made. Involving external experts is also 
potentially part of the transparency. 
The garbage can perspective is participating in explaining that public planning and 
control system are often very complex and even chaotic. There may be arguments 
favoring certain of such features, for example that ‘creative chaos’ may improve 
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innovation or that complexity gives flexibility and attending to many 
considerations and decision premises at the same time. But creating systems like 
quality assurance often try to make public decision-making more structured and 
simple. In this respect, some of the simplifying measures mentioned above could 
be appropriate. 
The most radical alternative to the quality assurance system would be to remove it, 
on the grounds that it potentially undermines the autonomy and influence of the 
ministries/agencies implementing the major projects, and to go back to the old 
system. The logic of this, if one cares about the goals of the quality assurance 
system, could be discussed and the costs of such a change could also be too large. 
Two modified versions of this might be to strengthen the planning and quality 
assurance expertise in those units with the most projects, or to establish a larger 
central unit to obtain resources to develop the professional strength of such a 
system. Such a unit could be connected either to the Cabinet/Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Government Administration and 
Reform. 
A third alternative between developing and improving the existing quality 
assurance system and removing it, which might strengthen some internal parts of 
it, would be to modify the role of the external consultants. The most natural 
solution would be to remove the private consultants from the QA1 phase, because 
this is meant to be a more typically politically oriented phase, and external 
professional expertise is more relevant for the QA2 phase. An alternative to this 
would be to limit the role of the external consultants in the QA1 phase, and 
possibly also in the QA2 phase. 
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